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UNDUE PROCESS 
Adam M. Samaha* 
 
59 Stan. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2006) 
 
This Article explores the relationship of the United States Constitution to the costs of gov-
ernment decision-making. Constitutional law clearly can escalate these costs, as when the due 
process clauses are read to mandate additional procedure not otherwise favored by decision-
makers. This much is understood. But the Constitution and its doctrine sometimes put downward 
pressure on decision costs. We lack a systematic investigation of when this is, and should be, true. 
I make three general claims: (1) The entire Constitution tends to reduce decision costs insofar as 
it is a focal point for confining disputes, and empirical work suggests that the document might not 
accomplish much else. (2) However, individual components of the text and its doctrine often in-
crease rather than decrease the costs of government decision-making. (3) This situation is not 
ideal. An intelligently crafted federal constitutional law of “undue process” seems just as attrac-
tive as “due process,” and some courts have experimented with the former. Neither process the-
ory nor implementation problems separate the two concepts, as long as courts are not tasked with 
optimizing government process. Yet the desirability of a generic undue process claim is tempered 
by the very conventions that allow the Constitution as a whole to reduce decision costs. Undue 
process claims therefore ought to be exceptional, even if occasionally potent, elements of federal 
constitutional practice. The most plausible occasions for successful objections are identified. 
 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Emily Buss, Adam Cox, Richard Epstein, Jacob Gersen, 
Bernard Harcourt, Eric Posner, Lior Strahilevitz, David Strauss, and Cass Sunstein for their helpful comments and suggestions, and to 
workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School and the University of Minnesota Law School. Excellent research 
assistance was provided by Shane Davis and Fred Yarger. 
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He has no equal on earth, being created without fear. . . . [O]f all the sons of pride he 
is the king.† 
But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other earthly creatures are, . . . I 
shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases, and the causes of his mortal-
ity . . . .†† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Locating the law of due process is too easy. Our statutes, regulations, case reporters, and aca-
demic journals are packed with ideas about when government makes decisions too precipitously, 
or without adequate participation, or with insufficient assurance of accuracy. For example, the 
minimum process necessary for a lawful government decision under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments is a renowned feature of the U.S. Constitution. And its associated scholarship has an 
almost immeasurable scope.1 Such inquiries are often connected to an attitude about government. 
They treat the state as a force to be feared and constrained, by process if nothing else.2 On this 
view, the most valuable parts of the Constitution include its due process clauses, preservation of 
habeas corpus, overlapping authority on matters of war and peace, and elaborate requirements for 
statute-making and constitutional amendment. Among the heroic instances of judicial intervention 
are marquee cases like Gideon v. Wainwright,3 Goldberg v. Kelly,4 The Steel Seizure Case,5 and 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.6 
 If you want to understand “undue process” — the point at which government decision-
making becomes too tardy, or too inclusive, or too careful as a matter of law — there is far less 
material competing for your attention. This is certainly true for constitutional law and theory. We 
do not have an integrated examination of the Constitution for the caps it places, or should place, 
on decision costs. And although the text seems to lack a cross-cutting guarantee against undue 
process, certain lines of constitutional law do cabin government procedure. Animating their drive 
for recognition is a conviction that an efficacious and efficient state is necessary to successful so-
cial life: that “the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty,” not to mention other 
demands for social justice.7 A vigorous state and sensible resource allocation are jeopardized by 
                                                 
† Job 41:25–26, in THE JERUSALEM BIBLE 777 (1966). 
†† THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 212 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1996) [1651]. 
1 For the years 1995 through 2005, more than 850 articles with “due process” in the title appear in Westlaw’s JLR database. No-
table earlier efforts include Edward S. Corwin, The Meaning of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 
(1911), and Lowell J. Howe, The Meaning of “Due Process of Law” Prior to the Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CAL. L. 
REV. 583 (1930). 
2 See, e.g., David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 2565, 2590 (2003) (“[T]he very reason that we adopted a Constitution was that we understood that the people and their represen-
tatives would be tempted to violate basic principles in times of stress.”); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presiden-
tial Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1993) (“To the extent that there is any ‘original understanding’ of the division of power 
between the President and Congress, it is that both are to be feared, neither is to be trusted, and if either one grows too strong we might 
be in trouble.”); Neal K. Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE 
L.J. _, _ (forthcoming 2006) (“[I]t might be said that a starting point for our government is the evil of government efficiency.”). 
3 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring state-provided lawyers for certain criminal defendants). 
4 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring hearings before termination of certain welfare benefits). 
5 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (denying presidential power to solve a labor-management dispute through mill seizure without clearer 
signs of congressional consent). 
6 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2772–75, 2786–97 (2006) (finding insufficient statutory authority for the trial of certain detainees by special 
military commission); id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (lauding judicial insistence on statutory authorization, absent emergency); 
id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (endorsing such legislation as “the result of a deliberative and reflective process engaging both of the 
political branches”). 
7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 35 (Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 15 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional government is still government . . . .”); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: 
ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 153 (1995) (“The American Constitution is an instrument of government, not an obstacle 
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excessive hand-wringing, all-inclusive roundtable deliberation, and unrealistic hopes for perfec-
tion. On this view, we ought to cheer for arcane provisions like the default date for congressional 
assembly and the rules of presidential succession,8 along with the double jeopardy, speedy trial, 
and full faith and credit clauses.9 We should celebrate pitifully obscure decisions such as 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia,10 Klopfer v. North Carolina,11 and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.12 
Even casual observers understand that government decision-making can be too costly as a 
matter of ordinary policy. Opposition to excessive decision costs is shared by everyone from 
Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner13 to Charles Dickens and Franz Kafka.14 Most of us already 
see that decision costs are as real as error costs, and that sometimes “the process is the punish-
ment”15 or “justice delayed is justice denied.”16 Anyone who forgot these lessons was reminded of 
them by the trial of Slobodan Milosevic and the relief effort following Hurricane Katrina. The 
international criminal proceedings against Milosevic lasted four years, cost perhaps tens of mil-
lions of dollars, and failed to reach judgment before the defendant died.17 In New Orleans, the 
delays were much shorter yet still devastating. Thousands were stranded for days without food, 
shelter, or medical care. Many were in places accessible to the news media but not to relief work-
ers operating within a confused, poorly prepared, and multi-layered decision structure.18 
 But is excessive process, like inadequate process, a constitutional problem in the United 
States? The best answer is awkward: The entire Federal Constitution is about reducing decision 
costs but most of its parts are not. As to the whole, the characterization does not rely on a deep 
theory about the proper substance of constitutional law. Like it or not, the text is a focal point that 
tends to confine the scope of disputes.19 In fact, this is just about the only sound reason to pay 
attention to the text. Some empirical work in economics and political science, largely ignored in 
the law literature, suggests as much.20 But the local picture is unlike the global view. In contrast 
with state constitutions inspired by Magna Carta,21 enforceable undue process norms are some-
what exceptional in federal constitutional law, whether we focus on plain text or judicial doctrine. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to government . . . .”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2263 (2001) (“[B]ureaucracy also has 
inherent vices (even pathologies), foremost among which are inertia and torpor.”). 
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2, superseded by id. amend. XX, § 2; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XX, §§ 3–4; id. amend. 
XXV. 
9 See id. art. IV, § 1; id. amends. V & VI. 
10 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (discussed below in Part II.B.2.a). 
11 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (discussed below in Part II.B.1). 
12 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (discussed below in Part II.B.2.c). 
13 See Ronald Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 77–78 (1985) (deny-
ing rights to the most accurate procedures); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 563 (6th ed. 2003) (summing error 
and decision costs). 
14 See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 13–14 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1996) [1853] (discussing the everlasting suit of Jarndyce 
v. Jarndyce); FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 234–36 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992) [1925] (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir translation) (describing 
the door-keeper to Law). 
15 MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 30–31 (1979); cf. 
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977) (“In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticu-
lously observed.”). 
16 LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER’S QUOTATIONS 276 (1977) (attributed to William Gladstone); cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
HAMLET III.i (1623) (“For who would beare . . . the Lawes delay . . . But that the dread of something after death . . . Puzels the will . . . 
.”). 
17 See David Scheffer, Jostling Over Justice, FOREIGN POLICY, May/June 2006, at 4; see also Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in 
Domestic and International Law, 55 DUKE L.J. 75, 146–47 (2005). 
18 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COM-
MITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA (2006). Blame is still being studied and 
assessed. 
19 See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1725, 1731–35 (2003) 
(using the focal point idea against dead hands objections); infra Part II.A.1.  
20 See infra Part II.A.2. 
21 See infra Part II.B.1. 
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Ordinarily the judiciary imposes procedural minima, not maxima, through its federal constitu-
tional decisions. 
 The question is whether this state of affairs is defensible. Can judicially enforced and other 
due process norms comfortably coexist with the usual absence of undue process norms? There is 
room for debate on this point but the answer is likely no, as a matter of principle. The arguments 
are almost equally strong for generic, entrenched, judicially enforceable due process and undue 
process norms. The current tilt toward due process is probably an artifact of centralization fears in 
past generations — a slant that underestimates nonsalient process costs borne by the general pub-
lic, along with the threat of a government that is crippled or that leverages its control over proce-
dure to obtain submission or bribes. Furthermore, whatever hope or hesitation one should have 
about supreme judicial review in due process disputes largely carries over into undue process ter-
ritory. Asking the judiciary to engineer “optimal process” through constitutional doctrine is im-
prudent, but a modest undue process norm would probably accomplish more good than harm. 
Like modern due process doctrine, the claim could incorporate deference to other officials and be 
fenced off from generally applicable rulemaking. 
 But the concrete issues are not about pure principle, nor are we faced with redrafting the Con-
stitution. This restricts the scope of defensible undue process claims. Establishing a generic undue 
process norm might entail the kind of creativity that is disfavored by the decision-cost minimizing 
role of the existing text. Oddly, then, the one global element of federal constitutional law likely to 
reduce decision costs — fidelity to text as understood through some interpretive method — is the 
most important barrier to infusing undue process norms into every government operation. Indeed 
the opportunity for judicial review itself tends to increase decision costs, which are not easily re-
duced by ready-made constitutional rules for this field. 
 The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies several episodes in which government 
process arguably has run out of control, and it introduces connections and distinctions between 
due and undue process. The concepts of decision and decision costs are then specified. Next, Part 
II searches federal constitutional law for its relationship to undue process. The connection is two-
fold. First, the Constitution tends to cut decision costs insofar as it is a reference for dispute reso-
lution. Contemporary empirical studies prompt the question whether constitutional law is capable 
of doing much else. Second, certain federal constitutional provisions and doctrines serve undue 
process missions. This pool of unappreciated examples is examined for its outer limits. A poten-
tially explosive phenomenon involves lower court extensions of Mathews v. Eldridge.22 These 
cases intimate a federal undue process claim with a scope rivaling the area now reached by con-
ventional due process doctrine, and they motivate much of the normative analysis in Part III. No 
one has presented a constitutional theory of undue process to date,23 but certain due process theo-
ries can be retrofitted to provide guidance. The question of judicial review is also taken up in Part 
III. It concludes that neither theory nor practical issues of enforcement will easily distinguish due 
from undue process. They are global norms of approximately equal attractiveness. But textualism 
and incremental judicial reasoning can confine the latter without eliminating the former. Many 
undue process claims are self-defeating in a way that most due process claims are not. Closing 
sections identify the most plausible undue process objections. 
                                                 
22 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (refusing to require a pre-deprivation hearing as a matter of “due process”). 
23 Preliminary thoughts can be found in Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process: Congressional Referral and Judicial Resistance in 
the Schiavo Controversy, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 505, 522–28 (2005). 
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I. DECISION AND COST 
A. Nightmares 
1. Stroud Township 
 Woodwind Estates, Ltd., wanted to build affordable subdivision housing in Stroud Township, 
Pennsylvania. It qualified for over $1 million in low-income housing tax credits to do it. But the 
state agency administering the credits conditioned their use on the development being complete 
within about twenty-eight months. Some local politicians and residents had no interest in allowing 
the developer to meet that deadline or any other. They were concerned about “the socioeconomic 
background of prospective tenants.”24 This was not a reason for rejecting the plan under the rele-
vant ordinance, however, and the town planning commission’s attorney concluded that the devel-
opment qualified for approval as a subdivision. None of this mattered. The commission first de-
clared that the plan lacked certain technical information. Next it sat on the revised plan for six 
months. Then it recommended denial of the plan, which course was followed by the local board 
of supervisors. They maintained that the plan had to follow the more demanding procedure for a 
planned unit development. The developer started to seek judicial review in state court,25 but it was 
too late. It decided the homes could no longer be built before the state agency’s deadline and the 
project was cancelled. The developer later sought damages in federal court asserting a violation of 
“substantive due process.”26 
2. Katrina and FEMA 
 Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced from their homes by Hurricane Katrina in 
August 2005. Televised pictures of those stranded in New Orleans were available every day. As 
news coverage became less intense, new bureaucratic problems mounted. One involved applica-
tions for disaster assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Three 
months after the storm, approximately 80,000 applications were listed as unprocessed by 
FEMA.27 Many of the applicants for housing assistance were fortunate, in the sense that the Red 
Cross had placed them in hotels and motels free of charge, and the federal government had taken 
over payment obligations for that effort. But FEMA wanted to discontinue the hotel/motel pro-
gram and this decision escalated storm victim demands for swift processing of their assistance 
applications. A putative class action was filed on their behalf, demanding preservation of ho-
tel/motel housing and challenging FEMA’s processing delays as a violation of the right to “due 
process” of law. 
3. Death row 
 Some estimates put the average cost of capital litigation at $2 million to reach a death sen-
tence or $7 million to reach execution.28 Part of the cost is associated with procedural protections 
for the accused, from pretrial proceedings to post-conviction habeas corpus. In addition, many 
capital defendants are indigent and the state may not leave them without legal assistance at trial or 
for an initial appeal.29 These outlays do not purchase speed, however. For an inmate on death row 
in 2004, the average time since the last sentence of death was about ten years.30 Such figures can 
be used to question the burden on taxpayers and the possibility of deterrence, but the situation 
                                                 
24 Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing the developer’s evidence at trial). 
25 See Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 39 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (M.D. Pa. 1999). 
26 See Woodwind Estates, 205 F.3d at 122, 125. 
27 See McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 227, 232 & n. 13 (E.D. La. 2005). 
28 See Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 50 (2000). 
29 See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
30 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2004, at 15 (2005) (appendix table 3) (calculated for states with 
ten or more inmates on death row). 
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could be injurious to inmates, as well. Years in prison facing death might impose unjustifiable 
suffering. A few foreign nations that retain the death penalty now have court-imposed limits on 
the delay between sentence and execution, and some U.S. lawyers contend that death sentences 
should be abrogated as cruel and unusual punishment when delay is excessive and attributable to 
the government.31 One complication is deciding how to fashion a test for “excessive” delay. Some 
Supreme Court justices might be comfortable with multi-factor inquiries, perhaps evolving into 
rules. Others seem to believe it is their duty to construct hard-and-fast constitutional doctrine up 
front, or not at all.32 
4. Filibusters 
 In 1806, the rules of the Senate were revised, omitting nondebatable previous question mo-
tions. This new edition of the rules opened the way, perhaps inadvertently, to the modern filibus-
ter.33 By the end of the century, senators developed a practice by which they could threaten legis-
lation and appointments with open-ended debate. Senate rules were amended during the twentieth 
century to address the filibuster, but the tactic was not eliminated. Rule XXII currently requires 
three-fifths of all senators to successfully invoke cloture,34 and contemporary practice usually 
avoids the spectacle of filibuster supporters actually having to hold the floor. Although filibusters 
may be controlled informally, the practical effect of Senate practice is to enhance the power of 
minority factions and even individual senators compared to outcomes under a majority voting rule 
for cloture. Some believe the status quo is unconstitutional.35 
5. “Peanut butter” 
 For certain types of orders, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must conduct trial-type 
hearings to resolve objections. An ingredient-based definition for any product calling itself “pea-
nut butter” was one such order as of 1959.36 In that year, FDA proposed that “peanut butter” con-
tain at least 95% peanuts. Manufacturers of the leading brands were unhappy. Theirs contained 
only 87% peanuts.37 Two years later, the agency blinked and published an order cutting the pea-
nut-content requirement to 90%. The manufacturers were unmoved. FDA issued a revised order 
in 1965, but the 90% clause remained and the order could not take effect before the manufactur-
ers’ objections were resolved. The agency got around to holding a hearing in late 1965. With ex-
tensive testimony and cross-examination, it went on for twenty weeks and 7,736 of pages of tran-
script.38 It was not until 1968 that FDA completed its revised order. The Third Circuit denied a 
challenge to the final version in 1970, which salvaged the 90% clause.39 Worry about agency abil-
ity to swiftly and efficiently adopt major new rules is the theme of administrative law’s ossifica-
tion literature.40 The concern extends to notice-and-comment rulemaking, not just formal rule-
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Lackey v. Texas, 514 
U.S. 1045, 1045–46 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 
32 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Fore-
word: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 26 (1992). 
33 See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE ch. 1, 
33–40 (1996) (claiming previous question motions were sometimes used by opponents of proposals, who achieved a day or more of 
delay by losing on the motion). 
34 See STANDING RULE OF THE SENATE XXII, pt. 2. 
35 See, e.g., John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the Senate Cloture Rule, 20 
J.L. & POL. 505, 520 (2004). But see, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445 
(2004). 
36 The current version of the statute is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1). 
37 See 24 Fed. Reg. 5,391 (1959) (judging by the weight of the finished food); Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by 
the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1143 (1972). 
38 See Hamilton, supra note 37, at 1144. 
39 See Corn Products Co. v. FDA, 427 F.2d 511, 517 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). The current version of the or-
der is at 21 CFR § 164.150 (2005). 
40 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86, 1412 
(1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and Regulatory Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 81, 82–84 (1996); infra note 264. 
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making of which the FDA orders are cousins.41 Some commentators blame courts. Attempting to 
better insulate a proposed rule from a judicial “hard look” at the record and the agency’s deci-
sion,42 an agency might lard on explanations, justifications, and responses to public comments. 
This boosts the resources necessary for such rulemaking, slows the progression from a proposal to 
an enforceable rule, and may increase the probability that any rule will do more harm than good 
in fields of rapid change. In the alternative, agency officials might abandon both formal and no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking in favor of less overt mechanisms for making policy.43 
6. Yucca Mountain 
 In the 1950s, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) be-
gan studying how best to store underground the radioactive waste from nuclear power plants and 
weapons production.44 There remained the decision about where to locate any such facility, but a 
coalition formed to prevent radioactive waste from continuing to accumulate at more than one 
hundred sites around the country. In 1982, Congress granted the Department of Energy (DOE) 
authority to build and operate an underground geologic repository, and it charged the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with compos-
ing rules on emissions and licensing for the facility.45 DOE conducted a preliminary investigation 
and recommended three sites for more intensive study. The President signed off in 1985. Then 
Congress narrowed the options in 1987, ordering DOE to study only one site: Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada, a ridge ninety miles from Las Vegas in an area that has already been used to test nuclear 
weapons.46 
 Much more process was to come, including public input, scientific investigation, agency 
rulemaking, state and local political reaction, and litigation. More than one hundred public hear-
ings and a year and a half of public comment took place between 1995 and 2001.47 At the tail end 
of that period, EPA, NRC, and DOE spent two years developing new standards for a repository at 
Yucca in light of statutorily required advice from NAS.48 Nearing the Act’s twentieth anniversary 
in 2002, the Secretary of Energy found the Yucca site suitable and recommended it for a permit 
application to NRC.49 This triggered an additional procedural check. The 1982 legislation granted 
Nevada’s governor or legislature a veto over the project, which could be overridden by a congres-
sional resolution.50 Nevada’s governor objected and Congress overrode his opposition.51 Yet con-
struction remains stalled. DOE is still working on a permit from NRC. And the D.C. Circuit re-
cently held that the repository must be designed to reasonably assure no excess radiation emission 
                                                 
41 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556–557. 
42 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983) (holding an agency acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously by offering inadequate basis and explanation for a rule change); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring “a concise 
general statement” of rule basis and purpose). 
43 See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10–14, 19, 224–55 (1990) (examining a shift 
after 1976 from new general safety standards to motor vehicle recalls). 
44 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON LAND (1957). 
45 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10132–10134, 10141(a)–(b). 
46 See Nuclear Energy Inst. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1259–60 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(1) (requiring hearings near Yucca); OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, RECOMMENDATION BY THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY REGARDING THE SUITABILITY OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE 
FOR A REPOSITORY UNDER THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982, at 32 (2002) [hereinafter DOE RECOMMENDATION] (estimat-
ing site evaluation costs at $4 billion). 
48 See 66 Fed. Reg. 32,073 (2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 55,732 (2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 57,303 (2001). 
49 See DOE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 47, at 45–46. 
50 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10135(b)–(c), 10136(b)(2). The statute also attempts to eliminate procedural roadblocks to a vote on a siting 
resolution in either House, including time limits on floor debate. See id. § 10135(d)–(f). Assuming the resolution is presented to the 
President for a highly improbable veto option, there is no problem under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (discussed below in Part 
II.B.2.a). 
51 See PUB. L. NO. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (July 23, 2002). 
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for perhaps one million years, in accord with statute and NAS recommendations.52 EPA had 
hoped that ten thousand years would be sufficient but the agency must revise its rule and DOE 
must reassess its design. DOE’s current goal is to open the facility in 2017.53 
B. Conceptual Introduction 
 Lawyers have traced and deconstructed the concepts of “procedure” and “substance” for so 
long that the questions are no longer very interesting. It is widely understood that procedural rules 
(however specifically defined) can trump substantive rights (however specifically defined), and 
that these substantive values can bend procedural norms. The degree to which the judiciary might 
be illegitimately clouding the surviving distinctions is also exhaustively investigated by academ-
ics. Attention to the procedure/substance dichotomy threatens more than tedium, however. It can 
overshadow equally important problems involving government decision-making. One of them is 
the issue of process, or decision cost, that is excessive as opposed to inadequate. Existing consti-
tutional law and theory sometimes grapple with this dimension, sometimes within the looser un-
derstandings of “due process of law.” But only sometimes, and not systematically. 
 The six controversies detailed above help expose the dimension of undue process. They arise 
in wildly different settings, they implicate vastly different trade-offs, and they scrape several 
ideological sensitivities. But in one way they are fundamentally the same: each poses a question 
about decision costs. A decision is on the agenda of a government official or institution and the 
process surrounding that decision is generating burdens of debatable value. The decision might be 
trivial or monumental. The costs might be suffered primarily by private parties or substantially 
shared with frustrated government officials. The cause of the burden might be official self-interest 
and bad faith, or resource constraints and negligence, or interest-group tactics and coalition-
building politics. Because different syndromes are at work, different remedies might be appropri-
ate. But regardless of the culprits, victims, and goals at stake, government decision-making can be 
excessively burdensome or even, as we shall see, unconstitutional. 
 A degree of conceptual slipperiness should be noted before going further, however. To an 
extent, the due/undue distinction can be deconstructed just like the substance/process distinction. 
Shifting the status quo, legal entitlements, and our perspective may convert some orthodox-
sounding due process objections into complaints about decision costs, and vice versa. Think about 
a simple adversarial dispute in which A sues B for possession of land. If A bears the burden of 
persuasion, A will demand some process for introducing favorable evidence. B presumably is dis-
advantaged by this “due” process demand, in that B is more likely to suffer an adverse decision, 
and B might then resist A’s demand as “undue” process, or ask for additional (“due”) process to 
combat the persuasiveness of A’s evidence. While granting both demands for more process might 
enhance judicial accuracy, the arguments have a zero-sum quality. So if instead A was in posses-
sion of the property and B filed suit, or B otherwise had the burden of persuasion, nothing analyti-
cally significant has changed. One might now label B’s initial demand for process a question of 
“due” process and label A’s possible resistance a complaint about “undue” process, but the struc-
ture of these disputes is the same. In fact, A might argue for more process as a remedy for unjusti-
fied attention to B, thus combining an “undue” process objection with a “due” process solution. 
The reverse is also possible: an argument to cut off any more process for B so that A’s interests 
are not lost from view. The due/undue distinction could then be characterized as an artifact of the 
                                                 
52 See Nuclear Energy Inst., 373 F.3d at 1267–73, 1299–1300; PUB. L. NO. 102-486, § 801(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 2921-23 (1992) 
(stating that the agency rules must be “based upon and consistent with” the findings and recommendations of NAS). NAS recom-
mended a time period it thought feasible for scientific analysis and long enough to include the greatest radiation risks. See NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS 6, 55 (1995). 
53 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Yucca Mountain Repository Schedule 1 (July 19, 2006), available at 
http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/info_library/newsroom/documents/CtrSchedule.pdf. 
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status quo, substantive entitlements, or labeling conventions, and one might say the court’s mis-
sion is simply to offer “optimal” process to warring parties. 
 More will be said on these subjects below but a few points can be made here. The present 
inquiry concerns the role of the U.S. Constitution and judicial review in limiting decision costs. 
Optimizing government process is the ultimate policy goal, but that directive might not make 
sense as enforceable constitutional law. The latter might aim for something less or different, espe-
cially if courts will have final word on the relevant questions.54 Aside from this complication, it is 
plainly true that commitments to substantive entitlements affect how process claims — all process 
claims — play out. Dedication to a particular conception of political speech, or physical liberty, 
or private property can make irrelevant the precise method of injury. Process can be the means of 
imposing burdens on highly valued entitlements, much like a fine or a tax; accordingly labels like 
“due” and “undue” may become unimportant. It is also true, however, that these substantive com-
mitments can be sticky. When constitutionally grounded, entitlements are difficult to rearrange 
and so stable patterns of due and undue process claims are likely to emerge. Although these enti-
tlements can be threatened by officials who either ignore their substantive value or attend to ex-
cessive protocol when making decisions, both kinds of threats should be recognized.55 
 In some ways, the most intriguing cases involve softer entitlements, where the scales are not 
already seriously tipped in one direction or where decision costs are suffered by less visible 
groups. Certain government procedures are more sensitive to one kind of decision cost than an-
other, by design or otherwise. When A sues B in a simple property dispute, costs are borne by 
third-party taxpayers C1–n who are not ordinarily thought to have justiciable legal entitlements at 
stake.56 The costs are nonetheless real and if the adjudicator is systematically overgenerous in 
granting process demands from both the As and Bs of the world, then we have an undue process 
issue. This is so even if process rights for A and B are perfectly well apportioned between them.57 
Here the unaddressed problem is a decision-maker too focused on salient parties in maximizing 
information and accuracy, or participation and case-specific legitimacy, or some other process 
value. Similarly, when A applies for financial assistance from a government agency or when B is 
detained on suspicion of criminal activity, potential assistance applicant C1 and possible crime 
victim C2 face risks that could be heightened by procedural safeguards for A and B.58 Moreover, 
trade-offs are being made along multiple dimensions. The burdens of delayed decisions, types of 
error, and financial cost are suffered differently by different people depending on the circum-
stances. When A and B are locked in a custody dispute and focused on accuracy and their partici-
pation, child C might suffer more from a delayed disposition than from any conceivable outcome 
on the merits.59 All of this makes it difficult to wash away due and undue process distinctions by 
rearranging typical entitlements for a given type of dispute, even when constitutional and other 
constraints permit it. 
                                                 
54 See infra Part III.A. 
55 See infra Part II.B.2.b. Hence “undue process” concerns can be addressed through entitlements. Some of these entitlements are 
usually considered substantive, like speech rights, see U.S. CONST. amend. I; others might be called procedural, like the warrant re-
quirement for certain seizures and the prohibition on excessive bail, see id. amends. IV & VIII. The latter cap process burdens on 
suspects and ensure process burdens for the state, where a contrary allocation presents risks that are in some sense intolerable — that 
is, where we are more concerned about one type of error (mistaken detention) than another (mistaken physical liberty). 
56 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1862–64 (2006). A taxpayer complaint would presumably demand 
less process for the litigants, not additional process for taxpayer input on the dispute — beyond what is necessary to establish the 
problem and cure it going forward. 
57 And perhaps even if the parties would be happy with less effort — although self-help will sometimes be available (for exam-
ple, negotiated settlement), and there may be offsetting public benefits to a public resolution of the dispute. See Owen M. Fiss, Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
58 See infra Part III.B.2.d (discussing quasi-Mathews cases). 
59 Accord Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1987). 
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 The six exemplary “nightmares” are reconsidered at the end of this Article. They involve 
process costs and trade-offs of the variety just indicated. But before constitutional law can be un-
derstood on these points, the concept of decision cost and its leading components should be speci-
fied. 
C. Working Definitions 
1. Decision 
 To make certain nothing important in constitutional law is overlooked, our working defini-
tions ought to be inclusive. “Decision” can therefore take a common meaning, albeit restricted to 
state actors. It means the resolution of an issue on the agenda of a government official or institu-
tion, involving a choice among courses of action or inaction that alters the status quo. This 
reaches well beyond critical forks in human affairs. It includes not only promulgation of an en-
forceable regulation but also the choice of rulemaking procedures; not only holdings in Supreme 
Court cases but also denials of certiorari; not only enactment of statutes but also ending debate. In 
any case, we should assume that consequences follow decisions and that undoing those conse-
quences would cost something. Furthermore, any decision can be characterized along several di-
mensions.60 Three are worth noting, because they directly impact tolerance for decision costs and 
the incentives of interested parties to engage in conduct that increases them. 
 First, a decision occupies an area. It aims to affect the environment within a subdivision of all 
government power. Compare, for example, a congressional appropriation for a pilot project with a 
federal prescription-drug benefit.61 Second, a decision might have a prescribed duration. Some 
decisions are definitely temporary. Their makers want the decision to expire on a date-certain, 
absent additional effort, as with sunset provisions in legislation and constitutions.62 Other deci-
sions have no such expiration date and their time frame is in that sense indefinite. Most nonap-
propriations legislation is nominally indefinite, for instance. Third and closely related, different 
degrees of resilience attach to a decision, regardless of an expiration date. Often a decision is, 
formally, just as easy to take back as it was to make. Ordinary statutes are like this. Alternatively, 
law sometimes makes a decision more difficult to unsettle than to issue. Federal courts treat their 
final judgments this way: Congress and Article III tribunals might have flexibility in deciding 
which judgments should issue and when they become final, but the Supreme Court has held that 
reopening those judgments raises constitutional questions.63 This is not to suggest that formal law 
alone dictates resilience or duration. Statutes with sunset provisions are sometimes habitually re-
newed, while inertia, agenda control, and path dependence can harden initial decisions as well as 
                                                 
60 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 17, 21 (1999) (tables 1.1 & 
1.2) (studying judicial decisions and employing categories of narrow/wide, shallow/deep, minimal/nonminimal, and strong/weak stare 
decisis). 
61 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001) (pointing out variety in statu-
tory impact). Sunstein separates the theoretical depth of a decision from its operative width. See Sunstein, supra note 60, at 16–19. 
Both ideas can be combined into “area.” To the extent that deep theoretical commitment affects other decisions, it is increasing the 
area of decision. 
62 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. V; Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, _ 
U. CHI. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2006). The Supreme Court has imported a similar idea into constitutional doctrine: the suggestion that 
race-based affirmative action in university admissions can survive for only twenty-five more years. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 342 (2003); cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 671–72 (2004) (recognizing the possibility of intervening technological change 
and a different outcome at trial). 
63 See infra Part II.B.2. Law might attempt to make reversal even easier than the initial decision. But these rules are often unde-
sirable and unstable. Decision-makers might spin-cycle through contradictory outcomes, or the formal arrangement will disintegrate. 
A purported majority voting rule, for example, may effectively become an ongoing supermajority requirement, as proponents of 
change anticipate instability without a long-term agreement from members of the minority. Accord David M. Barton, Constitutional 
Choice and Simple Majority Rule, 81 J. POL. ECON. 471, 474–79 (1973) (analyzing submajority rules); see also Adrian Vermeule, 
Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. POLI. PHIL. 74, 74–79, 89–90 (2005) (claiming that institutions 
thankfully use submajority rules, if at all, for preliminary, procedural, and agenda-setting decisions that tend to be difficult to reverse). 
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any resilience rule. The point is that decisions cover variable amounts of territory, in terms of 
their expected longevity and area of impact. 
 Part of making a decision is plugging values into these three variables. As the values become 
clearer, it becomes easier to evaluate whether reaching the decision was cost justified. When the 
decision is meant to temporarily govern a thin slice of human life with little significance to the 
governed parties, probably no substantial effort should be expended on the decision. The opposite 
is usually true for decisions that affect the lives of many people, in ways intensely important to 
them, with no sunset to limit the experiment, and when course corrections are especially diffi-
cult.64 
2. Decision costs 
 The idea of “decision cost” has been used by academics for decades,65 usually without elabo-
ration. The present study calls for some specification because not all of the concept is intuitive. 
 The key distinction is between decision costs and error costs. Decision costs are associated 
with reaching a decision; error costs are a possible consequence of that decision. Thus decision 
costs are generated before reaching any decision at all. Error costs, in contrast, depend on a deci-
sion. There is disagreement over precisely what counts as cost rather than benefit, but for now the 
concept can be inclusive. “Decision costs” therefore means any burden, such as a resource ex-
penditure or opportunity cost, associated with reaching decision. This covers time, money, and 
emotional distress from uncertainty, conflict, worry, and the like.66 And it reaches everyone who 
bears these costs, whether public or private actors. Civil litigation, for instance, generates decision 
costs for taxpayers, judges, plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, and others as disputants move to-
ward settlement or judgment. 
 One obvious driver of decision costs is “process.” Every official decision is arrived at by a 
method. Occasionally it is elaborate, as with the decision trees and influence diagrams recom-
mended for complex problems by some decision analysts.67 In other circumstances an official will 
rely on less, including snap judgment governed by heuristics. Either way, the issue of process is 
unavoidable. And the concept can be defined as any conduct for the purpose of reaching a gov-
ernment decision, including conduct that is lawfully compelled by or from private parties. This 
definition captures action designed to influence a decision even if it is ultimately ignored, while 
limiting the concept to action associated with the decision-making environment. Thus the rules of 
debate on the Senate floor govern process, as do the rules of discovery for civil litigation, but a 
speed limit does not.68 
 Typical features of government process can be quickly isolated. Process always includes at 
least one decision-maker and an agenda. No official is able to consider every issue, so the labor of 
                                                 
64 Accord 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 423 (1768) (“[M]ore time and circumspection 
are requisite in causes, where the suitors have valuable and permanent rights to lose . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Forward: Leaving 
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 17 (1996). 
65 Early development of the concept appears in JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT ch. 6 
(1962) (analyzing voting rules), and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 
J.L. STUD. 399, 400–02, 441–51 (1973) (calling for a summation of “direct costs” and error costs, and emphasizing their interaction). 
A related label is “evaluation costs.” E.g., John R. Hauser & Birger Wernerfelt, An Evaluation Cost Model of Consideration Sets, 16 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 393, 395 (1990). 
66 Accord Charles R. Adrian & Charles Press, Decision Costs in Coalition Formation, 62 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 556, 556 (1968); 
Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J. POLI. ECON. 877, 888 (1991). 
67 See PAUL GOODWIN & GEORGE WRIGHT, DECISION ANALYSIS FOR MANAGEMENT JUDGMENT 143–44 (3d ed. 2004). 
68 Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 204–06 (2004) (exploring adjudicatory procedure and fo-
cusing on institution-related conduct). I will not directly consider the steps by which decisions are implemented. We can also ignore 
the fine points of the substance/procedure distinction in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b), and so painfully debated in 
post-Erie case law. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426–27 (1996) (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938)). That distinction does not capture the right set of phenomena. 
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each is divided and devoted to separate (if overlapping) issue agendas, which are constructed in 
several ways.69 Beyond this, three elements are important. First is the selection of participants. In 
addition to those with decision-making authority, a given process determines who else should 
have input. Second, information collection is part of every process except, perhaps, snap judg-
ments. Decisions with any scrap of reflection will rely on data and other forms of knowledge, 
such as testimony during a public hearing, or prices on an information market, or an applicable 
rule of decision.70 Third, a process, especially one with multiple participants and significant in-
formation gathering efforts, involves some kind of deliberation. Deliberation — as in thinking 
through the proper resolution of a problem — is not always easy to separate from information 
collection. But a process need not include an effort to gather more data than is already known, or 
an increase in participants. Each process element can be cumulative and each comes at a price. 
 This working definition of process is so expansive, however, that it reaches conduct some 
prize for its inherent value or for consequences aside from reaching decision. The very task of 
enumerating decision costs entails controversial normative judgments about what counts as 
“cost.” Debate within a democratic institution, for example, can be valued because it generates 
public information and helps interests evolve in a morally satisfying fashion. To others, democ-
racy is essentially a transaction cost.71 Similar judgments attach to error costs. Dividing injury 
from benefit calls for a normative baseline. These divisions cannot all be stitched together here, of 
course. At the same time, disputed territory should not obscure large areas of agreement. Think 
about information collection. All else equal, we would rather that tax-paid government officials 
have relevant information with zero burden — that they immediately know everything they law-
fully ought to know before making a decision. That is impossible, of course, and so information 
collection often entails regrettable costs. 
 Other decision-cost elements are obscure to the uninitiated. Some involve the methods for 
aggregating judgments when multiple decision-makers have jurisdiction over the same issue. 
Countless scholars since Buchanan and Tullock have analyzed the decision cost implications of 
voting rules in multimember bodies.72 One message is that decision costs for any particular deci-
sion escalate, sometimes exponentially, as the voting rule dictates a greater degree of agreement 
among those eligible to vote. This is especially true if group preferences are relatively heteroge-
neous.73 Accordingly, unanimous consent is the most dangerous voting rule from a decision-cost 
perspective. A majority rule is much less costly to satisfy on average. Of course there are advan-
tages to striving for consensus. For example, overwhelming ex ante agreement might enhance the 
decision’s legitimacy, as in the willingness of affected parties to accept the outcome without 
struggle.74 The lesson is to remember the downside.75 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., B. Dan Wood & Jeffrey S. Peake, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting, 92 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 173, 
174–75, 182 (1998); Andrew J. Taylor, Domestic Agenda Setting, 1947–1994, 23 LEG. STUD. Q. 373, 387–88 (1998) (discussing con-
gressional rules and party politics). 
70 When “substantive” law governs the standard for reaching a decision, it is obviously connected to “process.” But it can be dis-
tinguished. Often what we call substantive law is an aspiration for human conduct, rather than an instrument for achieving it. Most 
people are probably happy to have a legal norm of reasonably careful driving, but they might be perfectly willing to eliminate the 
“process” involved in implementing that norm if they could. “Process” so understood is a more likely candidate for sacrifice. 
71 Compare BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE xiv–xv, 117 (1984), with 
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 154 (2003). 
72 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 65, at 45–46, 63–84 (distinguishing decision costs from “external costs”). In their 
model, the good/harm done by a decision is just a function of who agreed to it. 
73 See id. at 59–60, 68–69; Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Committee Systems, Optimal Committee Size, and the Costs of Decision 
Making, 44 J. POLI. 822, 823–24 (1982); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Public Choice, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 124, 
127–32 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1996). These models sometimes count only the cost of persuading others, so decision costs are zero 
for a single decision-maker. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 65, at 68; Janet T. Landa, The Political Economy of Swarm-
ing in Honeybees: Voting-with-the-Wings, Decision-Making Costs, and the Unanimity Rule, 51 PUB. CHOICE 25, 32 (1986). That 
understanding is too narrow for present purposes. 
74 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795–96 (2005); Tom R. Tyler, Proce-
dural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 308 (2003). 
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 Another cost driver expands the analytical horizon into substantive law. It is the well-worn 
choice between rules and standards, which have different cost profiles over time.76 A rule’s speci-
ficity leaves less discretion at Time 2 and so should reduce decision costs at that time and thereaf-
ter. The sacrifice is potentially higher error costs from hamstrung decision-makers at Time 2, 
along with higher decision costs at Time 1 when the rule must be crafted. The ongoing open-
endedness of a standard presents converse trades: the Time 1 decision costs associated with writ-
ing up a rule are avoided and error costs are hopefully minimized every time the standard is ap-
plied, yet the standard’s application at Times 1 and 2 will probably have a higher average deci-
sion cost than a stricter rule. Rules/standards scholarship thus encourages a survey of costs over 
time. 
 This points up an additional consideration: dynamic interaction among these elements and 
their influence on behavior across time. For example, a decision’s resilience could affect decision 
costs over time, although the relationship is complex. A decision’s formal resilience (e.g., the vot-
ing rule for repeal) can influence the willingness of people to attempt change in the next time pe-
riod. The difficulty is that resilience rules seem to push in directions opposite of the standard po-
litical science for voting rules. A consensus voting rule is supposed to entail the greatest decision 
costs. But the rule itself might scare off proponents of change who have little hope of achieving 
unanimity. Unless there are significant benefits from trying and failing, a demand for change 
might not materialize. Nor would the associated decision costs; the agenda would remain clear.77 
Similarly, a bare-majority voting rule suggests lower decision costs with a set agenda and a one-
shot timeframe. But the cost advantage is less certain over time. Choosing a seemingly low-
decision-cost process at Time 1 might generate intolerable decision costs aggregated through 
Time n (depending on the discount rate for those costs). If we care about sound policy over time 
and without a fixed agenda, we should also consider the dynamic interaction of decision dimen-
sions and decision-cost elements. 
 Lastly, high decision costs should be detached from the idea of “more process.” For the most 
part these values move in the same direction, but not always. Occasionally the solution to deci-
sion costs is changing the process in a way that makes it more resource intensive. Take delay. It 
might be that delayed decisions are the consequence of insufficient resources to complete all deci-
sions on the agenda, and that additional resources will eliminate the delay at an acceptable cost to 
taxpayers and beneficiaries. The complaint rests on intolerable decision costs (delay), yet the 
remedy might be labeled “more process” (additional decision-makers). This Article uses “undue 
process” as a broad term of art. It includes objections to decision costs of any kind, based on ei-
ther the burden imposed on particular parties or globally, and successful objections need not dic-
tate a protocol more streamlined than the status quo. 
* * * 
 The relevant phenomena should be clearer now, and perhaps unexpectedly common. Gov-
ernment decisions are choices that alter the status quo. Their significance can be measured by the 
area they cover, their intended duration, and their resilience to change. Each decision arises out of 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 An extension of this principle helps explain delegation trade-offs. We might think statutes entail higher average decision costs 
than agency regulations with the same content, because there are more veto gates or the decision-makers have less knowledge or for 
some other reason. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
81, 91–92, 96–99 (1985). 
76 See Isaac Erlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.L. STUD. 257 (1974) (considering the 
costs to private parties associated with ascertaining the possibility of sanction); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–63, 586–96 (1992) (distinguishing complexity and simplicity). 
77 Accord POSNER, supra note 13, at 651 (using the example of the number of senators per state, entrenched in constitutional 
text); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 639 (1991) (suggesting constitutions might take 
controversial topics off the table). Another possibility is that high resilience will encourage a supremely costly fight at Time 1 that 
overwhelms future savings, as Time 1 participants account for the higher stakes. Or change efforts might be perpetual. 
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a process, which requires a decision-maker and an agenda and which might include third-party 
participation, information gathering, and deliberation. All of this generates decision costs. Deci-
sion costs are likewise a function of voting rules in multimember bodies, the character of any law 
governing the decision, and the dynamic implications of a decision’s expected longevity. 
 Finally, it is apparent yet worth stressing that decision costs are impossible to evaluate with-
out understanding their sources and consequences. This can only be done with reference to the 
goal of a decision and the trade-offs of shifting to an alternative process. The causes of decision 
costs are not inherently good or bad, nor would any sensible person want decision costs to be im-
measurably low or infinitely high. But the judgments in between can be vigorously contested. To 
keep the inquiry inclusive, constitutional law ought to be investigated for any downward pressure 
it puts on decision costs, even if a net gain is unclear. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL READINGS 
 If forced to characterize the U.S. Constitution as generally imposing either floors or ceilings 
on decision costs, the answer will come easily for many. Not without reason. Our constitutional 
text seems to be bursting with procedural mandates — from the announcement in Article I, Sec-
tion 2 that House elections must be held biennially, to the delayed implementation of congres-
sional salary changes in the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. A careful review of federal constitu-
tional law, however, uncovers a concern about decision costs. The following pages identify the 
best candidates for undue process claims. But before conducting that search, which draws on 
ground-level inquiries into isolated pockets of constitutional law and practice, it is worth setting 
the sights much higher. 
A. The Whole Text 
 In a crucial sense, the entire Constitution limits decision costs. This is not a characterization 
of the document’s content or an assertion about the understandings of past generations who pro-
posed and ratified the bits of text that make up the document. It is a descriptive claim about the 
use of constitutional text today, and a supposition about the primary value of that text. 
1. Focal points 
 People in this country, as a matter of fact, refer to the U.S. Constitution in order to limit if not 
resolve issues. Insofar as issues are shaped or concluded with reference to the text, decision costs 
can be reduced compared to a state of the world in which no such text exists. The supremacy of 
this text, declared in Article VI and confirmed by much subsequent practice, supports this conclu-
sion. Other sources of law might inform our understanding of the document but we may rely on 
its meaning to trump those sources and end inquiries. For at least some part of the Constitution, 
moreover, the reduction in decision costs is worth the inability to more easily respond to contem-
porary preferences. 
 Students of indeterminacy in constitutional law might be uncomfortable with these claims at 
first, but they should not be very controversial. The supremacy of the federal constitutional text 
attracts discussion only rarely, and the document is subject to only so many understandings. Much 
constitutional text is relatively open-ended, without question. Moreover, extracting meaning from 
the document requires choices regarding interpretive method that are themselves contested.78 The 
most virulent arguments against meaning in texts are, however, unsatisfying. Extravagant post-
modern claims about radical indeterminacy always had the unfortunate quality of disproving 
themselves just insofar as the claims were intelligible. And even if there is no singular objective 
                                                 
78 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232, 
247–56 & n. 86 (discussing coordination by plain-meaning statutory interpretation, at least for cases that are “real dogs”); Adrian 
Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 549, 571–72 
(2005) (pointing out distributional consequences of interpretive methods, which might undercut coordination desires). 
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meaning to a text that is external to a given reader, groups can nevertheless develop agreement on 
the outer boundary of textual meaning. Sophisticated critical scholars are quite able to acknowl-
edge this.79 Within the area of this social agreement on meaning, or at least the boundaries of pos-
sible meaning, debate is unnecessary and decision costs can be economized. 
 A particular agreement about textual meaning could be bad or derived from a morally subop-
timal process, but neither undercuts the dispute-minimizing function of the document insofar as 
its readers come to widespread accord. Nor do we need to understand the precise mechanisms by 
which the U.S. Constitution achieved or maintains its status as supreme and worthy of respect. 
That written constitutions can be largely immaterial (Uzbekistan), and that unwritten constitu-
tional conventions can constrain equally well (England), undercut the sufficiency and necessity of 
writings as tools of constraint without demonstrating their irrelevance. 
 It is admittedly difficult to ascertain the degree to which the document controls outcomes and 
reduces decision costs. Certain disputes might be less costly to resolve without textual fidelity, 
which is probably increasingly true as the document ages. The clause requiring presidents to be 
“natural born citizen[s]” might be an illustration,80 compared to a situation in which voters have 
the freedom to decide whether this matters (whatever it means). In addition, much of what the 
constitutional text suggests might now occur because of tradition, status quo bias, persisting ideo-
logical preferences, or even physical architecture. Whether bicameralism would have survived in 
the absence of a supreme and entrenched Article I is an almost impossible counterfactual inquiry. 
At the same time, these are surely questions of degree alone. The text was useful in announcing 
an agreement and initiating government practices, regardless of other forces carrying them for-
ward, and even today debates are tied up with constitutional text. Judges, elected officials, and 
others use the document to frame discussions and invigorate their arguments. So the text seems to 
matter.81 
 To an extent, then, our constitutional text is a focal point for resolving or confining disputes. 
The notion is familiar from game theory, in which it may explain how certain coordination prob-
lems are solved.82 Thomas Schelling’s famous example was a decision about where and when to 
meet in New York City. If the participants cannot communicate and have only one shot to indi-
vidually select a location and time of day, the set of possible choices is so large that a meeting 
might seem hopeless. But some solutions were more salient than others to Schelling’s respon-
dents, especially if each participant thought about what their counterpart would think. An outright 
majority of Schelling’s (New Haven) respondents chose Grand Central Station and another large 
majority chose noon.83 
                                                 
79 Ely’s observation that “it’s a very bad lawyer who supposes that manipulability and infinite manipulability are the same thing,” 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 112 (1980), is not far from the sentiment of, for ex-
ample, DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 60 (1997) (“[I]n many cases in which the ideological 
stakes are high, legal actors have had a choice between two (or more) interpretations or definitions of a particular rule . . . .”), Jack M. 
Balkin, Deconstruction’s Legal Career, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 734 (2005) (noting that deconstruction as exercised in legal con-
texts should have suggested that “social construction placed constraints on legal decisionmaking and helped produce the internal sense 
in lawyers and judges that some arguments were better than others”), and Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) 
in the United States, 13 J. POLI. PHIL. 99, 108 (2005) (“As critical legal studies developed, bold and overstated claims that all results 
were underdetermined were replaced by more defensible ones . . . .”). A concise recap of the crits on con law is Louis M. Seidman, 
Critical Constitutionalism Now, _ FORDHAM L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2006). 
80 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 
MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968) (noting Barry Goldwater’s territorial birth). 
81 See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35–39 (2d ed. 2000) (taking the text as authoritative and fore-
closing readings “contrary” to it); Strauss, supra note 19, at 1747 (“[E]veryone thinks the words of the Constitution should count for 
something.”); see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 
(2002). 
82 See, e.g., DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 35–36 (1969); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF 
CONFLICT 54–58 (1963); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658–63 (2000). 
83 See SCHELLING, supra note 82, at 55 n.1, 56. 
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 Among others, David Strauss has characterized the Federal Constitution as a kind of focal 
point. His insight was that a focal point theory could help overcome the dead-hands problem in 
constitutional law.84 The problem is that most of the words contained in the written constitution 
were drafted and ratified before any of us were born and by people who are now deceased. That 
there are not more or different words to interpret is mainly the consequence of the same cross-
generational obedience: our decision to abide by Article V, governing amendments, which was 
also put in place by dead people. They operated under conditions and with preferences that differ 
radically from today’s. In a modern liberal democracy, insofar as the well-being of each person 
counts and dead people do not, a persuasive reason for abiding by the text is hard to come by. For 
example, actual consent of the living seems like a nonstarter under present circumstances if the 
concept has much meaning,85 and the document’s content is not perfect. After all, a vice president 
has a plausible textual argument under Article I, Section 3 for presiding at his or her own im-
peachment trial.86 
 A focal point theory begins to sidestep these difficulties. Reference to a written constitution 
will resolve and confine some disputes, if enough people expect the reference to be made, regard-
less of the document’s pedigree or theoretical legitimacy. A resulting drop in decision costs is 
worth celebrating. In this respect, the U.S. Constitution might be the Grand Central Station of 
dispute resolution for questions of government operation. In fact, the document includes a provi-
sion that solves half of Schelling’s coordination exercise: although it does not tell us where Con-
gress is supposed to assemble, the text does establish a default time.87 The particular date is far 
less important than the uncertainty and disagreement it avoids. This dispute-reducing characteri-
zation of the text might be particularly apt, considering Article VI supremacy and the difficulty of 
formal amendment. Such resilience means that the text sticks until an overwhelming agreement 
can be reached within the relevant institutions. 
  The argument is easily extended to Supreme Court judgments in constitutional cases.88 That 
the Court has asserted its own supremacy in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution89 should 
make little difference. Nevertheless, other government officials do abide by the Court’s judg-
ments;90 even Richard Nixon turned over his oval office recordings when so ordered. Federal 
courts are not always the most likely to provide correct answers to constitutional questions, of 
course, but that is not the test of whether judicial supremacy is a net positive development. Over 
the long run and compared to the alternatives, respecting the judgment of federal courts is defen-
sible and entrenched practice. It is not necessary to include judicial judgments before the benefits 
of dispute reduction are enjoyed, however. The text alone serves that end. This is sometimes easy 
to forget because the klieg lights of litigation are so often shut off in this context. At its most ef-
fective, the Constitution’s role in dispute resolution is invisible. 
                                                 
84 See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1733–35; accord Sunstein, supra note 77, at 638–39, 642 (exploring ways in which constitu-
tional entrenchment can be enabling by removing issues from ordinary politics); see also Barak Cohen, Empowering Constitutionalism 
with Text from an Israeli Perspective, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 585, 613–15 (2003). The problem extends beyond constitutional law. 
85 See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 30–31 (2004); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Origi-
nal Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 226 (1980). 
86 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRAGEDIES 75, 75–76 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). 
87 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (the first Monday of every December, unless altered by statute), superseded by id. amend. XX, § 2 
(noon every January 3, unless altered by statute). 
88 See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1380–81 
(1997); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 
43–45 (1993) (distinguishing judgments from holdings or opinions, and arguing that only the former should bind executive officers, 
while pointing out practical similarity with the alternative). 
89 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
90 See Daniel A. Farber, The Importance of Being Final, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 364 (2003). 
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2. Empirical inquiries 
 For all its advantages, the focal point function of constitutional text raises vexing questions. If 
the text actually constrains real-world operations, there remains an issue of proportion. How 
much constitutional law governs issues of little contemporary importance? How much of it solves 
pure coordination problems with rules to which no sane person attaches normative significance? 
How much of it covers (badly named) battle-of-the-sexes situations, where participants do prefer 
particular outcomes over others but prefer lack of agreement least of all?91 The more important 
constitutional law is to social well-being now, the less willing we should be to adhere to its stric-
tures when they conflict with today’s desires. 
 One response is to eliminate the tension by opening room for contemporary choice. It could 
be that the importance of text and conventional interpretive methods fades for issues considered 
important by present-day participants.92 Disputants will be encouraged to show how their position 
can be adopted without doing violence to text and standard methods of interpretation, but resolu-
tion of the matter will not be dictated by those sources. If true, this observation ameliorates the 
dead-hands problem by jettisoning the focal point function, rather than abiding by it. The system 
would be sacrificing the ability of text and interpretation to save decision costs in perhaps every 
significant dispute. 
 A second response comes from another direction. One might conclude that our constitutional 
text actually covers few significant disputes. It could be that the text is good for little other than 
dispute minimization. And so we can save the decision costs involved in fighting it, and the tran-
sition costs of change that has no sure value. Available numbers might disturb a legal scholar. 
Empirical work over the last twenty years suggests a variety of constitutional choices that have 
little or no measurable impact on social well-being. Past findings must be treated with care, of 
course. This field of rigorous statistical inquiry into whether and how constitutions matter is still 
developing, with important opportunities created by widespread constitutional change following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Occasionally the studies do not distinguish mere legal declara-
tions from actual influence on social practices, or incorporate controversial choices about which 
sorts of well-being count. But the work done so far is suggestive. Much of what legal scholars and 
judges wrestle with might amount to insignificant squabbles, with case-specific distributive con-
sequences at most. 
 Democracies and dictatorships. One long-running debate concerns the relationship to eco-
nomic development of the choice between democracy and authoritarianism. Scholarly opinion 
shifted and divided over the years.93 A particularly sophisticated investigation is the statistical 
study of 135 nations between 1950 and 1990 by Adam Przeworski and his co-authors. Although 
the patterns of economic growth diverge in wealthier countries — where democracies begin to 
use and benefit from economic inputs differently from dictatorships — the authors conclude that 
these two government forms do not appear to otherwise affect economic development. Democra-
cies do tend to have higher per capita GDP growth. But, they contend, this is because dictator-
ships experience faster labor-force growth.94 The principal goal in studies of this sort is to ques-
tion the necessity of authoritarianism in poor countries, but the results are useful beyond that. 
 Democratic institutional design. If democracy in general lacks a clear advantage over dicta-
torship in growing national income, one cannot expect dramatic effects from every institutional 
                                                 
91 See McAdams, supra note 82, at 1673 & n. 56. 
92 See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1743. 
93 See Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Political Regimes and Economic Growth, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 60–61 (1993) 
(collecting sources). 
94 See ADAM PRZEWORSKI, MICHAEL E. ALVAREZ, JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB & FERNANDO LIMONGI, DEMOCRACY AND 
DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950–1990, at 142, 166–67, 178–79 (2000). For a nice 
statement of difficulties in this field, including endogeneity, see Adam Przeworski, Institutions Matter?, 39 GOV’T & OPP. 527 (2004). 
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design choice within democracies. Xavier de Vanssay and Z.A. Spindler studied 100 countries 
using cross-sectional data from before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their regressions indi-
cated no significant effect on per capita GDP from certain entrenched constitutional attributes. 
The authors used dummy variables for these attributes but they swept widely, including bicam-
eralism, federalism, and a supreme court with some scope of constitutional review.95 Vanssay and 
Spindler did find a positive and significant effect from being “a federation” as opposed to “a uni-
tary state,” but only for OECD countries.96 The results also seem mixed when the dependent vari-
able is spending. A simple study from the 1980s found no significant effect on government spend-
ing in U.S. states and local governments from borrowing limits, tax or spending limits, line-item 
veto powers, or gubernatorial term limits.97 
 Rights, negative and positive. Doubts have been voiced about the positive impact of rights 
provisions, as well. The Vanssay and Spindler study tested a list of constitutional rights provi-
sions, including privacy, religious liberty, and social welfare guarantees, such as the right to an 
education, medical care, housing, and social security. Again the effect on per capita GDP does not 
appear to be statistically significant.98 Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer present similar conclu-
sions in a study of average annual per capita GDP growth from 1974 to 1989. One independent 
variable they tested was an average combined score for civil and political liberties based on Free-
dom House’s indexes from 1973 to 1986; they found no significant relationship to growth.99 
 Rights and the disadvantaged. Some might believe that individualistic rights adversely impact 
social equality. Such rights, like a vibrant takings clause, might activate judicial interference or a 
cultural orientation that thwarts equitable wealth distribution. Frank Cross recently attempted a 
first-cut test of these suggestions with a simple cross-sectional study of several economically de-
veloped Western nations. His regressions do not show a statistically significant effect from bills 
of rights and judicial review on poverty, either absolute or relative, although he does find a sig-
nificant increase in transfer payments to the poor in countries with a bill of rights.100 Cross’s study 
is framed as a rebuttal of Ran Hirschl’s provocative examination of constitutional judicial review 
in Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa. But the contrast is not terribly sharp. One of 
Hirschl’s central empirical claims is that the constitutionalization of rights in these countries “has 
                                                 
95 See Xavier de Vanssay & Z.A. Spindler, Freedom and Growth: Do Constitutions Matter?, 78 PUB. CHOICE 359, 365–66 
(1994) (finding effects from the savings/investment rate, educational achievement, an index of “economic freedom,” and population 
growth, which was inversely related). 
96 See id. at 363, 365; see also JAN-ERIK LANE, CONSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 208–09 (1996) (studying OECD coun-
tries and finding little connection between economic outcomes and democratic institutional design, though corporatist regimes seem to 
have high incomes and transfer payments). 
97 See Burton A. Abrams & William R. Dougan, The Effects of Constitutional Restraints on Government Spending, 49 PUB. 
CHOICE 101, 112–13 (1986) (cross-sectional analysis finding a relationship with increasing severance tax capacity or median income, 
for example). Abrams and Dougan did find a link between line-item vetoes and state-level spending. But the relationship was positive 
and it disappeared when state and local spending were aggregated. See id. at 112. For contrasting results, see Niclas Berggren & Peter 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Economic Effects of Political Institutions, with Special Reference to Constitutions, in WHY CONSTITUTIONS 
MATTER 167, 191 (Niclas Berggren, Nils Karlson & Joakim Nergelius eds., 2002) (collecting three studies). 
98 See Vanssay & Spindler, supra note 95, at 364. The authors got a negative sign for bills of rights. See id. One barrier to an ef-
fect from social welfare “rights” might be that courts are reluctant to enforce them even when these duties appear in constitutional text. 
See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 
1136 (1999); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1900–09 (2004) (explor-
ing variations in judicial intervention, including South Africa’s soft version). 
99 See Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institu-
tional Measures, 7 ECON. & POLI. 207, 210, 215, 219–20, 226 (1995). But cf. Gerald W. Scully, The Institutional Framework and 
Economic Development, 96 J. POLI. ECON. 652, 655–68 & n.3 (1988) (finding a link to GDP growth from 1960-1980, but using Free-
dom House indexes for 1973–1980 and converting them into dummy variables representing high and low ends of the scales). 
100 See Frank B. Cross, The Liberal Assault on the Constitution, Univ. of Tex. L. Sch. Working Paper (2006). Corporatism (as 
opposed to pluralism) seems related to higher absolute poverty rates, but the samples for Cross’s poverty data are small (n = 9 to 15). 
See id. at 23. 
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achieved little or no real change in arenas such as wealth redistribution, minority political repre-
sentation, and the equalization of life conditions.”101 
 Caveats are in order. Some constitutional choices certainly matter, according to the values of 
nearly everyone. The best known observation on this score is Amartya Sen’s regarding famine as 
a product of political failure. He claims that, at least since World War II, no famine has occurred 
in a multiparty democracy with elections and a free media.102 Insofar as the connection is causal, 
we have excellent reason to support basic democratic norms, even if there is disagreement about 
whether democracy could spur economic growth or should be used to fashion public-spirited citi-
zens. Furthermore, several studies indicate effective protection of property rights, long-term con-
tracts, and other market elements help with economic prosperity.103 Some of these are protected, 
at least qualifiedly, with constitutional law and judicial review. Finally, it could be that judicial 
independence and constitutional judicial review have a positive effect104 — although that result 
surely depends on the substance of judicial judgments, and it remains unclear exactly what those 
judgments should include.105 
 In any event, empirical studies cannot determine which dependent variables are normatively 
significant or priorities. Many studies are fixated on GDP, an available number reported with rela-
tive accuracy. This is only one proxy for human well-being.106 Income disparity, health, environ-
mental quality, and knowledge might be concerns, to take a few examples. So, too, for self-
expression and sex equality in many wealthy nations, or the desire to integrate a particular church 
doctrine with state operations in various parts of the world. Some of these standards for well-
being are not easily measured, making regressions difficult to run. Other standards might be 
measurable but reflect a social-justice based conclusion that some norms are inherently valuable, 
making any instrumental benefit less relevant.107 
 Yet uncertainty can elevate the importance of constitutional text and conventional interpretive 
method. These sources of meaning ought to guide constitutional choices more forcefully when we 
are less confident that the choice will make a difference.108 We certainly could do worse than our 
present Constitution; the issue is how confident we are that substantial improvement could be 
                                                 
101 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 151 (2004). 
Hirschl does state that the rights in question are “associated with precisely the opposite ethos, . . . planting the seeds for greater, not 
lesser, disparity in essential life conditions.” Id. Note that three of Hirschl’s four nations are not included in Cross’s study. See Cross, 
supra note 100, at 23. 
102 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 51–52 (1999) (“[F]amines are extremely easy to prevent if the government 
tries to prevent them . . . .”); id. at 178–88 (counting Botswana and Zimbabwe as democracies, along with India to claim that the ob-
servation holds for economically poor democracies); see also PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 94, at 228 (finding that life expectancy is 
longer in democracies, across national per capita income bands); Thomas D. Zweifel & Patricio Navia, Democracy, Dictatorship, and 
Infant Mortality, 11 J. DEM. 99 (2000) (asserting that democracies have lower infant mortality rates at every level of per capita GDP). 
103 See, e.g., Ronald J. Daniles & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Political Economy of Rule of Law Reform in Developing Countries, 
26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 99, 100–04 (2004) (collecting sources); Vanssay & Spindler, supra note 95, at 364; Wenbo Wu & Otto A. Davis, 
The Two Freedoms, Economic Growth and Development: An Empirical Study, 100 PUB. CHOICE 39, 57 (1999) (using panel data for 
about 100 countries). 
104 See Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 
J. POLI. ECON. 445, 448–55 (2004) (exploring the connection to economic and political freedom); Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Judi-
cial Independence and Economic Growth: Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND 
PUBLIC POLICY: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 251, 281 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006). 
105 It also appears that countries with long constitutions are in trouble. See Alvaro A. Montenegro, Constitutional Design and 
Economic Performance, 6 CONST. POLI. ECON. 161, 166–68 (1995) (measuring constitutional length by the number of “permanent 
articles” and suggesting an inverse correlation with per capita GDP in 1988 or thereabout). But the causal arrow is surely running from 
the nation’s problems to the document’s length. See id. 
106 See PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 94, at 4–6. 
107 Cf. AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 19 (2d ed. 1999) (distinguishing well-being from economic wealth); 
Martha Nussbaum, Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Social Justice, in THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
COSMOPOLITANISM 196, 210 (Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse eds., 2005) (stressing outcomes, as in “a list of entitlements that have 
to be secured to citizens, if the society in question is a minimally just one” where people are capable of “fully human living”). 
108 I mean a difference to society at large, not simply the short-term interests of litigants. 
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achieved by change. Three houses of Congress would probably be worse than two. But the opti-
mal number is unknown and possibly closer to zero. In such cases we can save the costs of crea-
tive decision-making and transition based on hunches. 
B. The Parts Elaborated 
 The dispute-reducing functions of constitutional text, interpretive method, and judicial judg-
ments reveal nothing about the specific content of federal constitutional law. And the message of 
the component parts need not reflect the principal function of the system. So far we have reason 
to believe that the U.S. Constitution and its conventional interpretation reduce decision costs 
compared to a universe without them, but we do not know if injunctions to cut such costs are em-
bedded within enforceable provisions. 
1. Cross-cutting norms 
 Mainstream impressions of the Constitution tend to reflect the minimum process it requires, 
not the additional process it forbids. Procedural floors are certainly easy to locate. Consider the 
protocols for generating positive law. The institutions and procedures involved in Article I, Sec-
tion 7 legislation and Article V amendment are elaborate, with bicameralism only one of many 
roadblocks. Of equal significance, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee “due process 
of law” before federal or state governments may deprive any person of life, liberty, or property. 
These provisions cover a wide range of private losses and are not expressly limited to a subset of 
government actors.109 Nor do courts restrict their review to whether officials abide by the process 
secured in ordinary law. It is settled, as much as any point of constitutional law can be, that Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment deprivations ordinarily should be tested against what process is con-
stitutionally “due” under the circumstances and with at least a measure of independent judicial 
judgment.110 In addition, a special set of procedural guarantees apply in criminal matters, with a 
laundry list of constraints in the Fourth through Sixth Amendments. 
 Finding a comparable message of procedural parsimony is more difficult or at least counterin-
tuitive. The very idea of constitutionally mandated ceilings on government process can seem bi-
zarre, evidenced by the Stroud Township litigation. There the developer claimed that township 
officials, with knowledge of the expiration date on the developer’s tax credits, intentionally de-
layed processing the development plan to prevent low-income housing from being built. To char-
acterize this claim, the lawyers and courts landed on the label “substantive due process.” The de-
veloper’s argument had nothing to do with skirting a conventional line between process and sub-
stance. The claim was emphatically about the process of government decision-making; it is just 
that the objection was to interminable rather than inadequate process. Of course the developer 
was attempting to protect an economic interest, and it was required to convince the courts that this 
(substantive) interest was entitled to constitutional respect.111 But this is also true when a party 
demands additional process, such as a hearing, to satisfy the requirements of “procedural due 
process.”112 Insofar as substantive due process is a catchall label for unorthodox constitutional 
challenges, it might fit here. But it remains a misnomer and an indication that undue process ob-
jections are not considered mainstream. 
                                                 
109 The Supreme Court has been unwilling to mandate individualized participation in general rulemaking processes, however. See 
Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984) (“The Constitution does not grant to members of 
the public generally a right to be heard by public bodies making decisions of policy.”); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (“Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that everyone should 
have a direct voice in its adoption. . . . . Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their 
power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.”). 
110 See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856). 
111 See Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding a protected property interest where the 
developer’s plan “indisputably satisfied all of the requirements for approval under the ordinance,” which “substantially limit[ed]” the 
township’s discretion to disapprove). 
112 See, e.g., American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). 
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 Is the disparate salience of due and undue process well-grounded? Undue-process sympathiz-
ers could assert that the spirit of the Constitution encompasses an active, albeit restrained, na-
tional government. Focusing on the trajectory leading to the original document gives this argu-
ment a little traction. Without question, advocates of the 1789 Constitution believed that the Arti-
cles of Confederation hobbled national success by leaving too much authority in the separate 
states. One whipping boy was a form of supermajority voting rule: under the Articles, Congress 
needed the assistance of each state to carry out its domestic orders, including requisitions.113 The 
1789 Constitution, for all its procedural mandates, was also a referendum on national efficacy 
through a degree of centralization. As such and compared to what came before, the Constitution 
might encompass some of the intuitions behind undue process objections. Contrast the written 
constitutional movements that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In a sense, they 
moved in the opposite direction. The complaints about the Soviet structure were not much a ques-
tion of excessive weakness or veto gates.114 
 That said, the document’s trajectory is a weak basis for manufacturing a cross-cutting undue 
process norm, at least if the commitment to textualism and conventional interpretive method is 
retained. There seems to be a hole in the text. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments make a 
commitment to due process without clearly encouraging undue process objections. The hole be-
comes more visible after state constitutions are examined. They do not include the broadest pos-
sible undue process dictate — for example, one that would cap decision costs in a given dispute 
regardless of the parties’ demands for process. But they do appear to go further than the federal 
text. In fact, one of the more popular state constitutional provisions promises speedy and inexpen-
sive justice, not only in criminal matters but also for civil litigation and possibly more. New 
Hampshire’s provision is typical: 
Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all in-
juries he may receive in his person, property, or character; to obtain right and justice freely, without 
being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; con-
formably to the laws.115 
Some scholars have been excited by the first part of these provisions, creating rights to remedies, 
without paying much attention to the last half.116 The reference to prompt, speedy, and corruption-
free justice is more intriguing for present purposes. It suggests a commitment to a type of undue 
process norm, one that receives occasional recognition in state courts.117 
                                                 
113 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 28 (2d ed. 2005). 
114 See, e.g., Joel C. Moses, Democratic Reform in the Gorbachev Era: Dimensions of Reform in the Soviet Union, 1986–1989, 
48 RUSSIAN REV. 235, 235–236 (1989). 
115 N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 14; see also ALA. CONST. § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. 1, § 11; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. 
2, § 6; CONN. CONST. art I, § 10; DEL. DECL. OF RTS. § 12; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 21; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 
18; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12; KAN. BILL OF RTS. § 18; KY. CONST. § 14; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; ME. CONST. 
art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. art. 19; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 24; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 
14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.Y. CIV. RTS. LAW ch. 6, art. 2, § 10; N.C. CONST. art 1, § 18; OHIO CONST. 
art 1, § 16; OR. CONST. art I, § 10; PA. CONST. art 1, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; 
TENN. CONST. art. 1 § 17; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 11; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 4; WASH. CONST. art 1, § 10; W.V. CONST. art 3, § 17; 
WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9; WYO. CONST. art 1, § 8; cf. GA. CONST. art. VI, § IX, para. I (“[T]he Supreme Court shall . . . by order adopt 
and publish uniform court rules and record-keeping rules which shall provide for the speedy, efficient, and inexpensive resolution of 
disputes and prosecutions.”). 
116 See, e.g., Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1296 (1985). For an 
illuminating historical inquiry into the remedy sections of these clauses, see John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort 
Law, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 565 (2005). 
117 Successful claims include People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 332, 339–48, 118 N.E.2d 262, 265–69 (1954) (in-
validating a qualified statutory 60-day waiting period before filing for divorce); Maury County v. Porter, 195 Tenn. 116, 119–20, 257 
S.W.2d 16, 17 (1953) (invalidating a statutory bar on eminent domain compensation trials until one year after highway completion); 
Werner v. Milwaukee Solvay Coke Co., 252 Wis. 392, 394, 31 N.W.2d 605, 606 (1948) (holding that the trial court had a duty to rule, 
pre-trial, on the constitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal Act, which would otherwise foreclose liability); cf. Kristanik v. Chevrolet 
Motor Co., 335 Mo. 60, 68–69, 70 S.W.2d 890, 893–94 (1934) (construing a statute to permit reviewing courts to order, without re-
hearing, payment of certain worker’s compensation claims). But many early claims concentrated on court filing fees and the like, and 
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 There is nothing new about these state constitutional provisions, either. Maryland, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, and Delaware adopted versions before the Federal Constitution was even 
drafted.118 And the basic idea was modeled on a more ancient source. Over five-hundred years 
earlier, the first edition of Magna Carta promised: 
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, 
nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the 
land. [¶] To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice.119 
This was part of the English barony’s effort to extract concessions from King John after a series 
of costly military campaigns, and it was a reaction to corruption and extortion in the royal courts. 
Litigation sometimes stalled for no reason other than selfish official whim, moved ahead only 
after the parties anted up something extra, or devolved into bidding wars among disputants. This 
might not seem so awful in a world with trial-by-battle. But it was a system that nevertheless 
irked the elites who demanded reform.120 As a consequence, Blackstone could conclude in 1768 
that “any delay in the granting [of the royal writs], or setting an unusual or exorbitant price upon 
them, would be a breach” of the Great Charter.121 
 The notion could not have been lost on those who ratified the original U.S. Constitution and 
brought about its first amendments. Early in 1788, The Federal Farmer criticized the original 
document for not enumerating additional rights in federal judicial proceedings, including an enti-
tlement “to obtain right and justice freely and without delay.”122 Later that year, the ratification 
convention in James Madison’s own Commonwealth of Virginia recommended amendments. One 
of them was a replica of the state constitutional provision quoted above.123 The North Carolina 
convention proposed essentially the same amendment, although that state failed to ratify until a 
second convention in 1789.124 Such clauses admittedly conjoin a right to civil remedies with a 
right to speedy, inexpensive, and corruption-free justice; perhaps the former was rejected and not 
the latter. But it remains notable that no such specific language made its way into the Constitu-
tion. 
 Given this background, the due process clauses are less likely to underwrite objections to de-
cision costs in general, or perhaps even privately suffered process burdens. These provisions for-
bid certain “depriv[ations]” from persons “without due” process. That phrasing can fairly be read 
                                                                                                                                                 
were largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Perce v. Hallett, 13 R.I. 363, 365 (1881) (concluding that the constitutional provision does not 
forbid fixed court fees to raise revenue but rather “gratuities, or exactions, given or demanded for the direct purpose of influencing the 
course of legal proceedings”); A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA 285–89 (1968) (noting a few victories in probate and as applied to an indigent litigant); see also Irish v. Gimbel, 691 A.2d 
664, 672 (Me. 1997) (upholding medical malpractice screening panels, despite delay caused mainly by discovery opportunities); 
Rochell v. City of Florence, 236 Ala. 313, 317, 182 So. 50, 51 (1938) (upholding a statute requiring a hearing and 24-hour notice to a 
municipality before an ordinance is temporarily restrained). 
118 See DEL. DECL. OF RTS. § 12 (1776); MD. CONST. art. XVII (1776); MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XI (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 
14 (1784); see also Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 137–38 (1970) 
(separating the heritage of state remedies clauses from due process guarantees). 
119 Magna Carta chs. 39–40 (1215), reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461 (2d ed. 1992); see also HOWARD, supra note 
117, at 284–85 (connecting the final sentence to state constitutions). For Coke’s paraphrasing, which is like the state constitutional 
provisions, see SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55–56 (6th ed. 1681) (“[F]reely 
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay.”); id. at 56 (claiming “right” meant “law”). 
120 See HOLT, supra note 119, at 106–08, 149–53, 164–65. 
121 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at 274. 
122 The Federal Farmer No. 16, Jan. 20, 1788, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 323, 328 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) 
(listing “law of the land” language separately). 
123 See Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), reprinted in EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 181, 184 (1957). Virginia called for speed in habeas corpus, too. See id. at 184; see also 
Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), reprinted in id. at 189, 190 (similar); Amendments Proposed by 
the North Carolina Convention (Aug. 1, 1788), reprinted in id. at 198, 200 (similar). 
124 See Amendments Proposed by the North Carolina Convention (Aug. 1, 1788), reprinted in DUMBAULD, supra note 123, at 
200; FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 113, at 308 (table 7.1). 
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as a guaranteed floor, or a series thereof, not a ceiling. Thus when A sues B for possession of 
property, A might demand a hearing to present her evidence, B might do likewise, and the court 
might invoke due process to ensure that the proceedings fairly incorporate the accuracy and par-
ticipation interests of both sides; but neither A nor B could raise a constitutional objection to a 
hearing for the other, nor could the court use due process norms to limit overall decision costs 
stemming from such procedural protections. Similar logic applies when a single party requests a 
license or other benefit from a government official. On this interpretation, moreover, the central 
notion of due process might track the distinction between decision costs and error costs: the rele-
vant deprivations appear to be consequences of a government decision, not the process leading up 
to it. Magna Carta and state constitutions are written differently. They point to right and justice, 
and they promise to reach that outcome without purchase or delay. The disjuncture of state and 
federal constitutional text does not seem to have an accepted historical explanation, but the anti-
undue process interpretation could fit with the context of the founding era and even Reconstruc-
tion. Perhaps the population of 1791 was more comfortable endorsing guarantees of swift and 
inexpensive action at the state level, a kind of guarantee that might have clashed with remaining 
skepticism about a major expansion of central government activity.125 Analogous skepticism 
about state-level action accompanied the post-Civil War Amendments. 
 There remain serious complications in the argument, however. It is still possible to extract 
undue process restraints from the due process clauses. The possibility arises in part because of 
incorporation doctrine, by which the Supreme Court has applied concepts from the Bill of Rights 
against the states. Some of the imported concepts have undue process attributes, like the right to a 
speedy trial126 and the prohibition of double jeopardy.127 If the idea of “due process” cannot in-
clude restrictions on decision costs of any sort, then the application of these guarantees against the 
states would be foreclosed. The Court has held otherwise, even though it creates an arguable re-
dundancy between the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause and other provisions in the Bill of 
Rights. These holdings create an opening for a broader undue process norm, which could find 
support, rather than defeat, in the tradition of Magna Carta and state constitutional law.128 More 
generally, the judicial history of the due process clauses is marked by flexibility. Those provisions 
have been cited to legitimize court theories of vested rights, opposition to retroactive lawmaking, 
limits on “taking from A and giving to B,” requirements of decision-maker impartiality, and re-
strictions on personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants129 — not to mention the most con-
troversial instances of substantive due process.130 The demand for notice and an opportunity to be 
heard might now be the most orthodox type of due process claim.131 But courts have moved the 
doctrine elsewhere. 
 There is no complete answer to these theories, but they are hard to accept at this stage. The 
incorporation argument is undercut by a realistic understanding of the compromise worked out by 
members of the Court over the years. An element of that compromise was to draw from within the 
boundaries of the Bill of Rights without obviously exceeding them.132 Court majorities picked and 
chose from an essentially closed menu defined by the first eight amendments. This helped confine 
judicial creativity and, therefore, decision costs. A freestanding undue process principle cuts 
                                                 
125 Cf. Linde, supra note 118, at 138 n. 38 (discussing right-to-remedy clauses). 
126 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–26 (1967). 
127 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794–96 (1969). 
128 Cf. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223 (linking speedy criminal trial rights to Magna Carta). Using a more flexible textual hook, like the 
privileges or immunities clause, might strengthen the argument. 
129 See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY chs. 1–2 (2003). 
130 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (joint opinion). 
131 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
132 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968); id. at 171 (Black, J., concurring) (accepting selective incorpora-
tion as a second-best to total incorporation). 
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against this grain. The general observation regarding due process flexibility offers greater hope to 
a broad undue process claim. But that outcome requires a more specific investigation into judicial 
practice. The sources covered so far weigh against generic undue process claims, and only a more 
localized inquiry can ascertain just how novel these arguments are. 
2. Localized norms 
 A general message favoring process restraint is difficult to identify, and yet federal constitu-
tional law is peppered with localized undue process norms. Not every bit of constitutional law 
with a potentially dampening effect on decision costs can be itemized here; that would necessi-
tate, among other efforts, listing every clause and judicial opinion articulating a constitutional rule 
instead of a standard. But several plausible undue process provisions and decisions can be fruit-
fully explained. These strands of law are largely isolated, partisan, or parasitic in character — 
with one potential exception. Some lower courts have experimented with Mathews v. Eldridge133 
in ways that could substantially extend undue process norms. These cases might reach essentially 
all of the territory now covered by due process doctrine. The discussion begins, however, in more 
settled areas. 
 a. Positive lawmaking. Perhaps the constitutional law most effectively minimizing decision 
costs receives no attention in litigation. Much constitutional text outlines institutions (bicameral 
legislature, one chief executive, one supreme court) and ground rules for their memberships and 
relationships (elections, appointments, the veto, scattered voting rules). Parties with conflicting 
interests can produce innumerable debates at the margins of these provisions, but key parts of 
their content have never been in dispute. This is consistent with the popular notion that the U.S. 
Constitution sets out a “framework” for the federal government. That label sometimes prefaces a 
claim that constitutional text fails to settle an important question against innovation, yet even 
these arguments aim to work within the given framework.134 Although we cannot be certain of the 
degree to which conscious fidelity to text constrains institutional character at the moment, we can 
be sure of the response to a suggestion that the Senate be abolished by ordinary federal statute. 
These basic institutions set the stage for positive lawmaking in a relatively predictable and stable 
fashion. 
 The content of positive law produced through these institutions is obviously more fluid. As a 
formal matter, decisions about the regulation of primary conduct are not particularly resilient. 
Such decisions must navigate the Article I procedure for statute-making, for example, and the 
restraints of other constitutional restrictions such as the ex post facto clauses. But unlike relatively 
frozen Article III judgments,135 there is no special constitutional hurdle to revisiting most regula-
tory decisions. The nation is free to rack up decision costs for decades considering and reconsid-
ering the desirability of national health insurance, progressive income taxation, and the regulation 
of abortion or greenhouse gas emissions. 
 Yet efforts have been made to specify precisely when new positive law is generated. One is 
the enrolled bill doctrine, which instructs courts to not look beyond the signatures of the presiding 
officers of Congress to determine whether a bill was actually passed by both chambers.136 Much 
of the rule’s benefit is enhanced public certainty but it can also reduce decision costs in litigation. 
                                                 
133 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
134 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245, 247 (2002). 
135 See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
136 See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669–73 (1892) (involving a bill signed by the President and delivered to the 
Secretary of State); Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1105, 1172–81 (2003); cf. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892) (stating that “if reference may be had” to the House Journal to 
check for a quorum, “it must be assumed to speak the truth”). But cf. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 n.4 (1990) 
(refusing to apply the doctrine to an origination clause challenge). 
Undue Process 09/11/2006 Draft Page 26 
 
There are analogous decisions in the Article V amendment context, as well.137 More significantly, 
the process for reaching a decision on statutory or constitutional text is occasionally moderated by 
courts. A powerful example is one of the earliest and least advertised constitutional decisions of 
the Supreme Court. In Hollingsworth v. Virginia,138 an out-of-state creditor asked the Court to 
ignore what is now accepted as the Eleventh Amendment. Hollingsworth argued, in part, that the 
plain text of Article I, Section 7 gives the President an opportunity to veto constitutional amend-
ments proposed by Congress.139 The purported Eleventh Amendment had been sent straight to the 
states for ratification. Hollingsworth’s objection was not without force, though it was perhaps 
weakened by the identical voting rules for veto overrides and congressionally proposed amend-
ments.140 In any event, the Court was in a poor position to repudiate an amendment restricting 
federal jurisdiction following the backlash to Chisholm v. Georgia,141 and a presentment require-
ment would have jeopardized the Bill of Rights, as well. The creditor’s theory was rejected within 
a day of oral argument, with Justice Chase suggesting that the president has no formal role in the 
Article V process.142 The Court’s position accords with the practice ever since, excepting two at-
tempts at a Thirteenth Amendment.143 Despite the absence of a stated rationale, Hollingsworth 
helped eliminate a veto gate for amendments, which should limit decision costs per attempt.144 
 Process-capping case law is tougher to identify when we turn to statute-making, but the Con-
stitution indicates limits.145 Consider the prospects for tricameralism. They seem dim. Article I, 
Section 1 tells us that “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” An indeterminacy-
loving provocateur might suggest otherwise, perhaps arguing that Congress could use the Article 
I, Section 7 statute-making process to authorize a third House and a method for populating it. But 
no conventional lawyer would accept the argument, which is a good proxy for adherence to the 
dispute-minimizing function of constitutional text. To be sure, a factor in this reaction might be 
status quo bias or preferences unhitched to constitutional law in any conventional sense. But the 
same outcome is easily reached with standard interpretive material. Tricameralism is out. 
 Still, much of what makes the federal legislative process difficult to complete is not dictated 
by conventional interpretation. Congressional committees are not mentioned in the Constitution 
but their workings are essential to understanding the legislative process. The committee system is 
legitimized by the internal rulemaking grant in Article I, Section 5, and doing so suggests discre-
tion within each House. It is this discretion, however, that would authorize the two chambers to 
                                                 
137 See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922) (using a state legislature’s ratification notice and the Secretary of State’s proc-
lamation to foreclose a claim that the legislature’s rules were violated). 
138 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). 
139 See id. at 379; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House 
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President . . . .”); see also id. art. 
V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments . . . .”); cf. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322–23 (Madison) (discussing executive vetoes and the threat of legislative power). 
140 See Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 209 (1972) (raising but 
rejecting the redundancy argument). 
141 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
142 See Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. at 381 n.*. Chase made the statement during oral argument. 
143 See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO 
WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 87, 91, 100 (1993) (stating that President Lincoln signed what became the Thirteenth Amendment, 
and outgoing President Buchanan signed a proposed amendment to entrench slavery against any subsequent amendment authorizing 
Congress to abolish it). 
144 See also Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (holding that each House of Congress may approve proposed 
amendments by a two-thirds vote of those present in the chambers); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 230 (1920) (holding that states 
cannot fetter ratification with non-deliberative popular referenda, without explicitly forbidding that option to Congress); cf. Dillon v. 
Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375–76 (1921) (holding that Congress may set a reasonable time limit for ratification of amendments). The long-
run effect on amendment attempts is, however, hard to estimate. See supra Part I.C.2. 
145 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (imposing a time limit on the President’s veto decision). 
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fabricate evermore elaborate decision structures.146 There is no obvious stopping point, making 
safety from tricameralism seem almost insignificant. The most important safeguard from decision 
costs in the positive lawmaking process, therefore, might be nonconstitutional. 
 One final stab in this field can be made with INS v. Chadha,147 which invalidated one-House 
legislative vetoes. A simple view of the case is that Congress, at Time 1, satisfied the require-
ments of Article I, Section 7 lawmaking while simultaneously extending its lawmaking role into 
Time 2, when an agency might depart from the preferences of either House. The Court eliminated 
these veto gates in Time 2. This rendering of Chadha is acceptable as far as it goes, but it neglects 
plausible congressional alternatives that might tally even higher decision costs. Absent any legis-
lative veto, Congress could engage in more detailed statutory drafting to cabin executive discre-
tion, or expend greater resources on agency monitoring through committee oversight, or system-
atically stall agency rulemaking.148 All of these options are consistent with Chadha. The case has 
an undue process complexion, then, only if judged in a static fashion or on debatable empirical 
assumptions. 
 b. Criminal procedure and rights parasites. The best known process ceilings appear in the 
criminal procedure clauses of the Bill of Rights. Criminal defendants must receive speedy trials, 
they need not testify against themselves, and they are immunized from double jeopardy. These 
restraints are now applied against state as well as federal officials.149 Yet even if aggressively en-
forced, they add little to the foundations of a generic undue process claim. These provisions are 
elements in a package of guarantees designed to promote the interests of the criminally accused, 
who often face serious losses with limited means, at the expense of the prosecution, which might 
have been especially feared when these clauses were adopted. Criminal defendants may take ad-
vantage of both process ceilings and floors.150 To take one stark comparison, consider informa-
tion-sharing duties. The Fifth Amendment grants criminal defendants immunity from compelled 
self-incrimination, while due process doctrine mandates disclosure of exculpatory evidence from 
the state to the defendant.151 Preoccupation with the undue process elements of criminal procedure 
is thus unwarranted. They are components in a partisan set of clauses that cannot deliver a larger 
message about decision costs.152 
 Outside of criminal procedure, the most secure undue process claim is parasitic. That is, other 
constitutional norms can be threatened by process, even if process is not their specific concern. 
One of these norms condemns “invidious” or “arbitrary” government action. Courts must be able 
to see something better than animosity before they will legitimate burdens imposed by the state,153 
                                                 
146 This is not to suggest that congressional committees will necessarily increase overall decision costs. One of their functions is 
to specialize, which can increase productivity, and delegation of authority to a smaller unit might avert cycling and other wasteful 
process. 
147 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
148 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801(a)(3), 802, 804 (enacted 1996) (delaying the effective date of any new “major rule” to give Congress an 
opportunity to reject it, but following bicameralism and presentment); see also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTION DIALOGUES: 
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 225 (1988) (asserting “open defiance and subtle evasion” of Chadha). 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 126–127. 
150 Judge-made habeas rules regularly cut against applicants, and these rules might be inspired by constitutional ideas. See, e.g., 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) (“This is a case about federalism.”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). But on 
habeas, ordinary principles of finality have already been relaxed. 
151 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
152 One idea that has migrated beyond the criminal context is indigent access to judicial process. Compare Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 16–20 (1956) (plurality opinion) (quoting Magna Carta and requiring free transcripts for indigent criminal defendants when 
needed for an effective appeal, even if the state may eliminate all appeals); id. at 24–25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), with M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 106–07 (1996) (similar in parental rights termination cases), and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 
(1971) (holding that divorce cannot be denied to a couple simply because they could not afford the court costs). These cases have well-
known limits, logical or not. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444–45 (1973) (adjudging the interest in bankruptcy dis-
charge less fundamental than divorce, and refusing to require an indigency exemption from filing fees); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 
656, 659–60 (1973) (per curiam) (similar for appeals from agency reduction of welfare benefits). 
153 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
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and excessive decision costs can violate this principle. Now, judicial inability to see legitimate 
objectives might be grounded in a contestable, value-based selection of conduct or classes as wor-
thy of constitutional protection. But this would reinforce the point: the case outcomes would then 
be deeply parasitic, recognizing process burdens as mechanisms for undermining (controverted) 
constitutional values without intimating anything further about excessive decision costs. 
Much the same can be said for more specific constitutional values. No court would permit a 
legislature to impose heightened evidentiary requirements on free exercise claims or Latino plain-
tiffs, simply for the purpose of disadvantaging that conduct and that class. Some actual free 
speech cases fit this model. When a bureaucracy seeks to review the content of private expression 
before licensing its dissemination, courts impose an obligation to respond swiftly.154 Quick re-
sponse times might actually increase the overall cost of licensing, of course, but these court deci-
sions are sensitive to regulatory burdens on valued conduct. Equal protection cases are similar. 
Courts episodically invalidate attempts by one segment of the population to elevate the procedural 
hurdles that another segment must clear in order to make legal change. Leading examples involve 
entrenching opposition to antidiscrimination laws in state constitutions or city charters.155 In any 
event, the presence of additional process is not doing much work here. Process is just a type of 
cost made troubling by its effect on independently valued conduct or parties. 
 c. Final judgments and litigation burdens. The examples just mentioned might be partisan 
or parasitic, but the insulation of final federal judicial judgments looks downright parochial. Arti-
cle IV compels interstate respect for state court judgments without mentioning their federal coun-
terparts.156 Yet federal courts have determined that any gap in the Constitution regarding the final-
ity of their judgments is intolerable. First, in the absence of legislation, the federal judiciary de-
veloped a common law of preclusion.157 Second, the Supreme Court announced a constitutional 
barrier to reopening certain federal judgments. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.158 invalidated a 
federal statute insofar as it required federal courts to reopen final federal judgments in civil law-
suits on grounds not established in the prejudgment law.159 
 Plaut’s holding is qualified, sometimes troublingly so. Congress may still prospectively dic-
tate when a federal judgment becomes “final.” In addition, the Court only demanded insulation 
for the home team: the federal judiciary. No protection was given to state court judgments,160 plus 
territorial courts and federal agencies were distinguished into a category of non-Article III tribu-
nals entitled to less respect.161 The Court might not be unbendingly self-protective here; a subse-
quent case made injunctions more vulnerable to legislative disruption than damages judgments.162 
Yet its constitutional policy in these matters is as conceptually isolated as criminal procedure and 
the rights parasites cases. The latter two categories skew decisions toward a vulnerable class of 
                                                 
154 See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Henry Monaghan, First Amendment Due Process, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
518, 522 (1970). 
155 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 631; 
Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) (striking down Nebraska’s attempt to constitution-
alize opposition to gay marriage, without finding a federal constitutional obligation to recognize it), rev’d, 2006 WL 1933417 (8th Cir. 
July 14, 2006). 
156 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (reserving to Congress authority to enact general laws prescribing the manner in which these 
judgments will be proved “and the effect thereof”). 
157 See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001). 
158 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
159 See id. at 218–23 (emphasizing founding era examples of state legislatures granting new trials or otherwise judging particular 
cases). 
160 To be precise, the Court said it wished to avoid calling into question state legislation, see id. at 226–27, 234 (withholding 
judgment on due process objections), which indicates even less about state court judgments. Accord Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 
102, 106–07 (1947) (allowing federal price controls to interfere with tenant evictions backed by state court judgments). 
161 See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232; cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928–29 (1997) (cabining federal authority to direct the 
actions of state officers, but distinguishing state courts). 
162 See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 342–45 (2000) (addressing prison-reform litigation). 
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litigants and favored private conduct, while the final judgment cases show judicial opposition to 
political judgments that might entail more work for the courts themselves. If there is a deep lesson 
in Plaut, it might concern a syndrome rather than a policy worth promoting. 
 Not all judicial creativity is baldly parochial. Constitutionally inspired litigation immunities 
shield a range of unwilling litigants from the burdens of judicial process. Within certain spheres 
of official conduct, courts grant absolute immunity from damages to legislators, judges, and high-
ranking executive officials.163 States and state agencies similarly enjoy damages immunity against 
private plaintiffs, although Congress may sometimes abrogate it or bargain for consent to suit.164 
Qualified immunity from damages for individual officials, which shields discretionary conduct 
when not clearly unconstitutional, is also a valuable defense. In fact, a justification for it is related 
to decision costs. The idea is that many officials are sensibly delegated discretion to make judg-
ments, sometimes quickly and in the face of serious danger, which can be unduly fettered with 
worries about litigation.165 Finally, every out-of-state defendant in civil litigation is protected 
from certain assertions of personal jurisdiction. Relying on the due process clauses, the Supreme 
Court demands some kind of connection with the forum state before its courts may reach a bind-
ing judgment.166 Each of these doctrines is partial to some class of litigant, but each provides an 
effective objection to process burdens. 
 d. Quasi-Mathews and substantive due process. A smattering of other precedent intimates 
constitutional concern for excessive process. There is one standout, however: a judicial sensitivity 
to delay, at least when the decisions of nonjudicial officers are challenged, those officers are en-
gaged in tasks akin to adjudication, the private need seems acute, and the justification for inaction 
underwhelms the courts. These decisions might protect either traditional real property rights or 
“new property,” and in that regard the intervention fits in more than one ideological slot. But 
while these cases present enormous opportunities for undue process claimants, they remain rare. 
 The two most important examples of judicial intervention run on slightly different doctrinal 
tracks. The first extends from — or perhaps contorts — Mathews v. Eldridge.167 At first look, this 
is a strange platform on which to build an undue process claim. The case was initially taken as a 
path-marking reaction against procedural mandates in the administration of government bene-
fits.168 Perhaps the decision reflected emerging hostility to the benefits themselves, but even sup-
porters of government assistance to disadvantaged populations can see risks associated with proc-
ess-maximizing dictates. As a general matter, poor people do not want process; they want to be 
less poor. If we assume a fixed budget, then resources devoted to process “may in the end come 
out of the pockets of the deserving.”169 Moreover, the doctrinal contribution of the case was es-
sentially anti-process. Rather than selecting procedural mandates according to dignitary interests 
in participation or by historical analogy, the Court endorsed a flexible balancing test. That test 
does suggest high decision costs in its application (it is a classic standard), but it allows officials 
to combat demands for additional procedural safeguards by pointing out administrative cost. And 
these cost arguments were couched as “interests” that might justify good-faith agency decisions, 
                                                 
163 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 516–28 (4th ed. 2003). 
164 See Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724–29 (2003); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755–77 
(1999) (noting consent and other limits). 
165 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814–19 (1982). It is possible Congress could override these immunities. 
166 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 
YALE L.J. 189, 233–34 (1998). The minimum contacts cases do not necessarily free defendants from all litigation burdens. The result 
might be only a more convenient forum. 
167 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
168 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Adminis-
trative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 28–30 (1976). 
169 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348. 
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not freestanding constitutional requirements.170 The opinion looked like good news for legislative 
and agency discretion. 
 Innovation can have unforeseen consequences, however. On a second reading, the Mathews 
opinion may show a streak of undue process. Eldridge had demanded a hearing before the agency 
cut off his disability benefits; the agency offered a hearing only after the status quo had changed. 
The disagreement was therefore about timing, with the recipient requesting speed.171 To be sure, 
Eldridge was not simply asking for a quick deadline on a final agency decision; the agency’s 
quick response had been to stop sending him checks. Eldridge wanted a process in which the 
status quo was more resilient — he would continue to receive benefits while the agency com-
pleted a more intensive review of his eligibility — which fits with orthodox conceptions of “due 
process as more process.” Even so, his case is a step closer to an undue process claim. 
In addition, Mathews’ utilitarianism created intellectual space for undue process claims. Its 
balancing test placed governmental interests in decision costs on the same plane as private inter-
ests in process modifications.172 At the time the case was handed down, the message might have 
been about leveling down the strength of private demands. Yet the decision can also be read to 
suggest a heightened judicial sensitivity to the mundane costs of process. When joined with the 
task of making something like an all-things-considered evaluation of administrative process, 
courts might then add ordinary decision cost concerns to the category of private interests, without 
sensing they are leaving constitutional law behind. Once constitutional judicial review is triggered 
by a cognizable interest in the benefit at hand (the possibility of which Mathews did nothing to 
diminish), applicants could be free to challenge agency process as either unduly dismissive of 
their interests or unduly laborious in reaching decision. 
 Some lower federal courts made this transition. Faced with complaints about the burdens of 
administrative delay, they adapted Mathews’ utilitarian inquiry and accepted the viability of con-
stitutional objections. Thus a landlord might get swifter relief from rent control,173 an allegedly 
disabled child can receive an annuity without years of bureaucratic review,174 and an immigrant 
could gain relief from deportation efforts.175 Even courts less sympathetic to such complaints have 
employed Mathews to help resolve the question.176 One persistent issue in the welfare setting is 
                                                 
170 See id. at 335 (listing “the Government’s interest, including . . . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail”); id. at 349 (demanding that substantial weight be afforded good-faith administrator 
judgments about what process is due). 
171 See also Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975) (“[T]he rapidity of administrative review is a significant factor in as-
sessing the sufficiency of the entire process.”); cf. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 590 (1926) (addressing federal equity 
jurisdiction and stating that “[p]roperty may be as effectively taken by long-continued and unreasonable delay in putting an end to 
confiscatory rates as by an express affirmance of them”). But cf. City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003) (rejecting a delay 
claim as applied to recovery of a monetary penalty for allegedly illegal parking); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 747–48 
(1974) (upholding deferral of litigation opportunities in the post-collection tax context). On the timing issue generally, see LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-14 (2d ed. 1988). 
172 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
173 See Kraebel v. New York City Dep’t of Housing Preservation & Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 398–99, 403–06 (2d Cir.) (reversing 
dismissal of a landlord’s claim that a city agency violated due process by delaying reimbursement for certain lost rents from senior 
citizens, but indicating deference to agency resource allocation and stressing that the landlord alleged an indisputable right to money 
otherwise owed by lease), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 917 (1992). 
174 See Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Board, 625 F.2d 486, 490–91 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a delay of almost four years in 
processing a disability benefits application through three layers of administrative review was a denial of due process, despite the 
agency’s assertion of limited resources); see also Walter v. City & County of Denver, 983 P.2d 88, 91 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). 
175 See Singh v. Reno, 182 F.3d 504, 507, 510–11 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding a colorable due process claim, permitting direct review 
in the court of appeals, where years of INS delay in holding a hearing resulted in a criminal alien being barred from seeking discre-
tionary waiver of deportation under a statute enacted in the interim). But cf. Elia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 268, 275–76 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting a delay-based due process claim where a hearing was not held until after the alien had served five years in prison), cert. 
denied, 126 S.Ct. 2019 (2006). 
176 See, e.g., Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting a claim involving additional hearings in Medicare Part 
B appeals, while acknowledging “delay can be so unreasonable as to deny due process”); United States v. Batson, 782 F.2d 1307, 
1312 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating “delay in the administrative process can rise to the level of a denial of due process”); Wright v. Califano, 
587 F.2d 345, 354–56 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting “unrealistic and arbitrary time limitations [for survivor’s benefits appeals] on an 
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whether applicants have an interest at stake that can be protected as “life, liberty, or property” 
under the due process clauses.177 One might conclude that the constitutional interest of an initial 
applicant is somehow less potent than that of a recipient who was later cut off, like Eldridge. This 
distinction might not matter under the broadest versions of undue process; the claim would arise 
from any sort of unjustifiable decision cost and need not serve the entitlement interests of any 
particular beneficiary.178 It could target global decision costs even if error costs rise. But these 
lower court cases are tracking ordinary due process doctrine and, as such, they are building undue 
process claims with a scope similar to familiar due process law. 
 Several qualifications and concerns should be raised now. First, quasi-Mathews claims have 
limits. They might be premised on a constitutionally required hearing of some sort; without that, 
there is no obvious trigger for the timing question. This prerequisite would immunize a large 
amount of executive action, because the Supreme Court has repudiated such participation re-
quirements for generally applicable rulemaking.179 It appears that only adjudicatory-like action is 
exposed. Even within this domain, the objections have not been especially successful.180 One such 
claim was filed on behalf of Hurricane Katrina victims who demanded a more responsive FEMA. 
The district court refused to order processing deadlines, which confirms that sympathetic plain-
tiffs are insufficient for success.181 Furthermore, quasi-Mathews claims animate objections from 
private parties, not government officials or a broader public interest. This might be because the 
due process clauses are built that way and these claims must be in accord, or because the costs of 
government process are often spread to countless, faceless individuals with whom judicial review 
is not much concerned.182 Either way, these cases serve a subset of all interests. Finally, there is a 
risk to validating these claims, explored below.183 It involves expanding undue process norms 
without moderating due process dictates. There is a manic, five-finger fillet quality to constitu-
tional doctrine when courts demand enhanced accuracy and participation at the same time they 
call for speedier decisions with lesser burdens on private parties. Without special care, process 
ceilings might crash into process floors. 
 The second set of lower court examples is similar, although they invoke “substantive due 
process.” An important success is the Stroud Township housing controversy. There the Third Cir-
cuit reversed judgment as a matter of law awarded to township officials, concluding that the de-
veloper had a viable constitutional claim based on evidence of delay and procedural burden in-
tended to thwart low-income housing construction without regard to local law.184 On this theory, 
                                                                                                                                                 
agency which for good faith and unarbitrary reasons has amply demonstrated its present inability to comply”); cf. Schroeder v. City of 
Chicago, 927 F.2d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (rejecting a firefighter’s attack on an eight-month delay in commencement of 
state disability payments, at which time he received retroactive benefits, but acknowledging that “at some point delay must ripen into 
deprivation”); O’Keefe v. Murphy, 38 N.Y.2d 563, 568, 381 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823, 345 N.E.2d 292, 294 (1976) (“[W]henever a delay in 
an administrative adjudication significantly or deliberately interferes with a party’s capacity to prepare or to present his case, the right 
to due process has been violated.”). 
177 Cf. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60 (1999) (finding, in the alternative, no protected interest in con-
tested “reasonable” and “necessary” medical benefits); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 426, 431–33 (1982) (finding a 
protected interest in a disability discrimination claim that was dismissed because of untimely agency action); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 
55, 66 (1979) (same for a racehorse trainer license that had been suspended). 
178 These interests can be served in ways other than orders to expedite hearings or decisions. Interest can be added to financial 
benefits claims if they are vindicated. Cf. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 339 (noting availability of retroactive payments). This is not helpful to 
those in dire straights, but worth noting. 
179 See supra note 109. 
180 See supra note 176; see also Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of East Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 999 (1st Cir. 1992) (requiring 
inquiry into adequacy of state remedies, like mandamus); Steven Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 MICH. L. 
REV. 1423, 1434–35 (1968). 
181 See supra Part I.A.2. The district court was willing to extend the hotel/motel program, see McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 
2d 221, 233–37 (E.D. La. 2005), producing tension with concerns about agency resource allocation that supposedly justified its rejec-
tion of plaintiffs’ due process claim. 
182 See infra Part III.C.1. 
183 See infra Part III.C.2. 
184 See Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 120–22, 125 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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people have “the right to be free from harassment in their land development efforts” and the ob-
jection does not depend on an unfavorable decision.185 The process itself is the constitutional 
problem. These cases are therefore tightly linked, conceptually speaking, with the quasi-Mathews 
decisions. Both depend on a constitutionally cognizable interest but neither can associate the in-
terest at issue with a set of rights that are overtly and doctrinally favored in the modern era.186 
These courts are protecting rather pedestrian interests, with undue as well as due process. 
The substantive due process tack has not been especially successful and its label does not help 
matters. The doctrine has been tainted with unease over appropriate judicial standards and value 
choices. With housing development in particular, some observers might worry that seemingly 
procedural objections are rhetorical techniques for skirting the weakness of takings doctrine,187 or 
even reviving judicial entrenchment of economic power structures in a pre-New Deal throw-
back.188 It seems not to have been noticed that some of these claimants were asserting objections 
akin to those of beleaguered welfare applicants, and that an objection to process burdens in sup-
port of a supposed entitlement is no more “substantive” than a plea for respect through additional 
process. In any event, even the Third Circuit lost enthusiasm for these sorts of claims. It did not 
eliminate them, but it did hold that an “improper” motive was insufficient, the challenged official 
conduct must “shock the conscience,” and having no basis in state or local law is apparently not 
shocking enough.189 If this attitude was not represented on the Supreme Court before, it is now. 
Then-Judge Samuel Alito wrote the opinion for a divided court of appeals. 
* * * 
 Nothing like a global directive to economize on decision costs in light of process benefits 
emerges from this review. The leading candidate for reducing decision costs is just the constitu-
tional text, plus some method of interpretation, and adherence to judicial judgments. Contempo-
rary empirical work suggests that doing so jeopardizes little, while achieving some restraint on 
constitutional debate. To be sure, there are localized undue process norms. Some are uncontrover-
sial even if partisan or parasitic, as with criminal procedure and the application of other constitu-
tional values like speech, religion, and racial equality to process burdens. And more could be 
done through extensions of Mathews and other due process doctrine. But so far, undue process 
claims tend to protect relatively narrow classes of constitutionally favored individuals or behav-
ior. 
III. UNDUE PROCESS IN THEORY 
 What is the proper role for undue process norms in federal constitutional law? If the Constitu-
tion could be redrafted without cost, what kind of undue process provisions ought to be inserted, 
                                                 
185 Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 268–69 & n. 15 (3d Cir. 1995) (indicating that the key questions are 
whether officials ignored the merits or acted with “improper” motive); cf. Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (allow-
ing an equal protection claim to go forward against a mayor who, out of personal animosity, attempted to thwart renewal of a liquor 
store license); Mitchell v. Kemp, 176 A.D.2d 859, 575 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (invoking arbitrariness against a 
land-use moratorium and a delayed zoning ordinance). 
186 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
187 See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005) (permitting takings claims to be channeled through 
and finally resolved in state courts); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) 
(rejecting the argument that a temporary development moratorium to formulate a land use plan was a per se taking). But cf. Rapanos v. 
United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2214–15 (2006) (opening an opinion on the Clean Water Act with a discussion of cost and delay in 
obtaining permits from “enlightened despot[s]” in the Army Corps of Engineers). 
188 Cf. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting 
that “[f]reedom from delay in receiving a building permit is not among these ‘fundamental liberty interests’” covered by substantive 
due process, making irrelevant any official arbitrariness or caprice). 
189 See United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399–400 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying the test 
found in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)); accord Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113, 114–15, 
118 (1st Cir. 2006) (housing developer); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d. 1369, 1371–75, 1386 (11th Cir. 1993) (ware-
house developer). 
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if any? Should extant constitutional law be pushed in that direction, building on the quasi-
Mathews cases? These are difficult questions. To address them sensibly, this Part takes four ana-
lytical steps. First, some basic constitutional options are clarified and narrowed. Optimal process 
of law is rejected as an impractical goal for enforceable constitutional law. Second, the underlying 
justifications for undue process concerns are elaborated with guidance from existing process the-
ory. Third, the question whether undue process ought to be supreme constitutional law is exam-
ined. That calls for an argument about political failure. Institutional and pragmatic questions also 
are worth raising, especially the character of judicial review. Fourth, the analysis can be made 
concrete by its application to particular disputes. The discussion accordingly ends by returning to 
the undue process controversies described in Part I. 
A. Constitutional Options 
 The ultimate question is whether a general concern for decision costs ought to be the kind of 
law often associated with the Constitution: supreme over other forms of law, revocable only by 
Article V amendment, and enforced with some type of judicial review. This raises the stakes. And 
we can make the inquiry more challenging by accepting up front the rights-parasites cases and 
other outcomes fairly dictated by existing constitutional text, conventional interpretive methods, 
and judicial judgments. This includes irrational or totally senseless process, akin to compulsive 
hand-washing or an addiction to snap judgments. Consider it forbidden by a generic constitutional 
opposition to arbitrary government decisions.190 For reasons already given, these are all situations 
with strong reasons for invalidating process burdens.191 The focus should be on more general ob-
jections. 
 Progress can be made with a few initial distinctions among choices. If we assume constitu-
tional law will include some sort of general process norm, then there are roughly four options: 
(1) a demand for optimal process of law, 
(2) a demand for due process of law, 
(3) a prohibition on undue process of law, 
(4) a combination of due and undue process guarantees. 
Selecting option 1 would make the others irrelevant, as all government process would be tested 
against (some measure of) optimality. Option 2 is part of current federal constitutional law, while 
option 3 represents an alternative world in which the Constitution and its doctrine are only con-
cerned with excessive process or unjustifiably high decision costs. In fact, the demands of due 
and undue process can be moderated to points well below and above any estimated sacrifice dic-
tated by optimal process, such that space is left for nonconstitutional judgment. It might be odd if 
this moderation did not occur. Otherwise due process norms could produce, as a matter of consti-
tutional mandate, decision costs up to or even in excess of the optimal level but then permit addi-
tional burdens as a matter of discretion; undue process might have the same character but driving 
in the opposite direction. No good reason for these outcomes is apparent. Given space between 
due and undue process, option 4 is different from option 1. The former calls for sensitivity to both 
excessively burdensome and inadequate process, yet it stops short of blanketing the field with 
constitutional law. 
                                                 
190 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 426 (1982) (vindicating a due process claim); see also Village of Wil-
lowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000) (per curiam) (focusing on allegations of intentionally different treatment plus arbi-
trariness to validate an equal protection claim involving a couple’s delayed connection to the municipal water supply). 
191 See supra Part II.A. 
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(2) due process 
(nonconstitutional judgment) 
(nonconstitutional judgment) 
(1) optimal process 
FIGURE 1:  SOME CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS
 
 It is worth emphasizing, however, that these stylized norms are not mirror images. Undue 
process involves complaints about excessive decision costs. Those complaints may rest on bur-
dens suffered by any number of victims — whether private parties to a dispute, government regu-
lators, faceless taxpayers, or nameless alternative beneficiaries — and they might be addressed 
with more than one kind of remedy. A successful objection may or may not entail the removal of 
a specific process element.192 But the essential feature is an argument that someone (or everyone) 
is suffering excessive costs from government decision-making. In contrast, a sensible due process 
claim is obviously not framed as a demand for additional decision costs. In its orthodox proce-
dural aspect, the claim is for an added process safeguard, such as more effective notice and an 
opportunity to participate in legal proceedings.193 When successful, these claims tend to escalate 
decision costs without asking for them. Decision costs are usually just the price for some process 
benefit, such as accuracy or legitimacy in the ultimate decision. The connection between these 
versions of due and undue process, then, is that both include constitutional objections tied to 
process and both directly influence decision costs. This leaves four related, if not perfectly sym-
metrical, choices. 
 Option 1 should be eliminated at the outset. Current constitutional text surely does not man-
date a generalized inquiry into government process for the purpose of achieving its objectives at 
the dream-level of cost. The closest existing doctrine comes to this idea is in the quasi-Mathews 
cases, where some courts demand expedited administrative action without explicitly tempering 
process mandates that survive Mathews itself.194 But these cases did not clearly eliminate room 
for policy judgment (not knowingly, anyway). And we have no assurance that the judiciary aimed 
for, much less hit, the optimal form of process under the circumstances. With so many moving 
parts, less than predictable dynamic reactions, imperfect information, and limited court compe-
tence,195 optimal process of law is a poor fit with supreme judicial review. Add to these concerns 
the doctrinal creativity involved in fabricating optimal process norms, and it becomes an ex-
tremely unlikely addition to judicially enforced federal constitutional law. Multi-institution col-
laboration and experimentation is a superior course. Optimal process is a fine aspiration, and no 
harm would be done if it were a hortatory clause in the Constitution, but more than that is imprac-
tical. 
                                                 
192 See supra Part I.C.2. 
193 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985). 
194 Recognizing Lackey claims would lead to a similar complication. See infra Part III.D.1. 
195 See infra Part III.C.2. 
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B. Process Theories and Undue Process Policy 
 The live options are combinations of due and undue process, and a resort to general theory 
can help. A handful of process theories have become standard guides to the objectives of proce-
dure. Normally they are used to guide judgment on the minimum level of process to which a pri-
vate party is entitled, but parts of their logic may comfortably extend into undue process norms. 
The first set of theories discussed is an offshoot of fundamental rights and dignity arguments. The 
second set encompasses a wider group of objectives, and can be labeled utilitarian. 
1. Rights retrofitted 
 One theme in process theory concentrates on the relatively intrinsic importance of individual 
participation.196 Before government officials reach a decision affecting private interests, the ar-
gument goes, they ought to provide an opportunity for affected parties to voice their opinions. 
Whatever additional consequential benefits might come from this participation, it shows a respect 
for the individual that human dignity requires. Limited resources and other competing interests 
can qualify or override this dignity-based argument for participation; they must, practically speak-
ing, in the modern state. But for some theorists, this is the central justification for process. A re-
lated and less developed theory draws on notions of fundamental rights. Using a given analytical 
resource, like contemporary moral reasoning or natural law or heritage, certain rights may be 
privileged with exceptional legal protection. Perhaps a right to some level of participation in at 
least some government decisions qualifies for fundamental status.197 
 But if the law of process should revolve around individual dignity or fundamental human 
rights, it will be difficult to make room for undue process objections. These theories might be 
specified in several different ways, making it difficult to reach a firm conclusion, but undue proc-
ess seems to be a poor fit regardless. None of these theories directly concern net social welfare. 
They vindicate an intrinsically valued conception of dignity, or shield vulnerable individuals or 
high-priority conduct. The capacious versions of undue process are in no way this limited. In fact 
they would energize opposition to dignity-based process demands, perhaps even overriding offi-
cial decisions that grant extensive opportunities for voice to all interested parties. Even from a 
standpoint internal to dignity and fundamental rights theories, these ideas probably cannot support 
a vigorous undue process norm. The mismatch occurs because of the type of injury with which 
the latter is concerned. These versions of undue process are reflected in the quasi-Mathews cases 
and our working definition of decision costs.198 That definition is inclusive. It incorporates any 
cost associated with decision-making: money, time, uncertainty, and so on. Many of these bur-
dens are ubiquitous and, partly for that reason, perfectly ordinary.199 Dignity and rights theories 
are attuned to the extraordinary. 
 Ronald Dworkin’s Principle, Policy, Procedure is in accord. Dworkin understands the func-
tional significance of process in achieving rights that trump ordinary utilitarian calculations. Their 
principled recognition can be undermined if unaccompanied by a process that identifies rights 
violations with some degree of accuracy.200 This attention to accuracy is revealing, however. 
Dworkin is not enthralled with process per se, at least in adjudication, which he largely treats as 
                                                 
196 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 81–100 (1985); TRIBE, supra note 171, at 666–
67; Mashaw, supra note 168, at 49; Richard Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 117–18 (1978); cf. 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972) (referring to both fair play and mistaken deprivations); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
264–65 (1970) (asserting that “[f]rom its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all 
persons within its borders”). 
197 See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 72–73 (connecting process to meaningful rights). 
198 See supra Parts I.C.2 & II.B.2.d. 
199 Accord Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80 n. 22 (downgrading “rather ordinary costs” of process compared to a right to a hearing before 
a property deprivation takes place). 
200 See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 72–73, 77 (focusing on adjudication). 
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an instrument for respecting rights. He argues that no one has a right to the most accurate proce-
dure regardless of cost, even though rights are otherwise at stake and there is a distinct moral 
wrong inflicted when the innocent are convicted or held liable.201 Instead, (1) the criminally ac-
cused have a right to be free from prosecution when officials know the accused is innocent202 and, 
more generally, (2) individuals have a basic procedural right with two elements: those who issue 
procedural rules must “correctly assess the risk and importance of moral harm” from rights viola-
tions (for example, they cannot ignore the special problem of rights deprivation by deciding to 
flip coins to determine guilt), and the risks imposed in one class of cases must be consistent with 
our best theory of moral harm suggested by practices in the other classes.203 Little seems to 
change if there is a converse right to defeat unfounded claims of right.204 This right indicates ad-
ditive claims to process in the service of accuracy, but it need not produce rights in one party to a 
dispute (much less third parties) to minimize the procedures demanded by another party. Thus 
Dworkin writes with respect to civil litigation, “neither party has any right against procedures 
more accurate than the accuracy required by” his basic procedural right.205 Nothing in this analy-
sis indicates even a narrow version of undue process as a right, fundamental or otherwise. 
 That said, dignity and rights theories can be extended to a subcategory of undue process prob-
lems. Obviously constitutional rights like the freedom of speech or the free exercise of religion, 
and the opposition to racial caste, can be undermined by strategic use of burdensome process. 
This is a rerun of the rights parasites cases described above and it should probably be a point of 
consensus. These accepted constitutional norms insulate conduct or parties from (indefensible) 
burdens, and process can be no less burdensome than a tax or fine. In addition, the concept of 
human dignity might be implicated by oppressive procedure. Part of that concept demands that 
people be treated with the respect owed to human agents, that when their personal interests are at 
stake they should be “personally talked to about the decision rather than simply . . . dealt with.”206 
Delayed decisions entail costs within the concern of undue process and, under certain circum-
stances, could implicate this dignity-based interest in not being ignored.207 Less realistic scenarios 
might be problematic in this dual fashion. Requiring only the poor to personally participate in 
hearings involving their debts would not only impose ordinary costs on that class, it might also 
carry an intolerable suggestion of untrustworthiness from a dignity theorist’s perspective. 
 Yet all of this is fairly modest. The examples are derivative: an independent commitment with 
a high, possibly lexical, priority is threatened by process but only coincidently. The essential 
problem is humiliation, or free speech, or some other value. Process is just one vehicle for the 
injury. On the other hand, demands for additional process might be more easily associated with 
“fundamental” human values. For instance, promoting opportunities for voice, such as a public 
hearing in which a person or her advocate can explain her position, seems to be a theme in the 
work of dignity-oriented process scholars.208 Preventing someone from enjoying such participa-
tion, for the purpose of saving cash or avoiding hassle, cannot enjoy the same priority within such 
theories, especially insofar as costs are shouldered by officials and taxpayers. Otherwise every 
                                                 
201 See id. at 72–74, 81, 92. 
202 See id. at 79. 
203 See id. at 88–93, 96; see also id. at 85 (“[N]o decision may deliberately impose on any citizen a much greater risk of moral 
harm than it imposes on any another.”); id. at 95–96 (stating that these are not rights to a particular level of accuracy in adjudication). 
204 See id. at 96 (“When issues of substance are at stake, the defendant’s rights begin where the plaintiff’s leave off . . . .”) (em-
phasis added). 
205 Id. Dworkin does go on to assert that no residual utilitarian policy question about admission of additional evidence is left over 
once the parties’ basic procedural rights are respected. See id. at 97. 
206 TRIBE, supra note 171, at 667; see also id. at 666. 
207 Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (“For when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and 
when the State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be 
prevented.”). 
208 See supra note 196. 
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fundamental right might have an anti-right shoving in the opposite direction. The very idea of 
fundamentality would then lose meaning. Granted, a theory of rights cannot easily dictate maxi-
mum accuracy in the adjudication of rights regardless of cost. But at least the motivation for en-
hanced decision-making procedures is tightly connected to arguably imperative concerns. 
2. Utilitarianism and rule of law 
 The theories just discussed can support a few undue process arguments but not many. A more 
utilitarian theory promises to encompass the panoply of objections. 
 Utilitarian cost/benefit analysis certainly fits with sensitivity to the pedestrian burdens of 
government decision-making, and it provides no obvious reason for partisanship.209 Costs im-
posed on private parties are no different in principle from costs borne by government officials, 
their employers, or taxpayers. Moreover, utilitarianism can be sensitive to all sorts of decision 
costs: money, time, consternation, despair, opportunity costs. And cost/benefit analysis can be 
applied regardless of the goals chosen for a given process: accurate information about existing 
law and historical fact, or better application of law to individual cases, or creation of socially 
beneficial new law, or peaceful acceptance of government decisions, or even moral legitimacy.210 
These goals all come at a price, which will sometimes be intolerable compared to the decisional 
objectives. Indeed in some cases, decision costs are imposed for nothing recognizable as a benefit 
— such as when process is irrational or a tool for defeating valid rights claims.211 In a more chal-
lenging set of cases, decision-makers acting in good faith accept decision costs in exchange for 
enhanced accuracy or some other legitimate objective. These situations can raise difficult ques-
tions about the wisdom of the exchange and the appropriate strategy to prevent poor choices. Ei-
ther way, utilitarian inquiry may provide a framework for the answers.212 
 A case also can be made for a broad undue process policy to protect democratic outcomes and 
the rule of law. First, in some situations government officials (or private parties) take advantage 
of process burdens to cloak their opposition to the directives of positive law. The rights parasite 
cases are examples, and the Stroud Township development fight might be as well. In these cases 
process is imposed as a technique for evading substantive policy judgments ordinarily entitled to 
respect. Regardless of the implications for fundamental rights or dignity, utilitarians can see the 
advantages of undue process norms for confirming the illegality of such circumvention. Second, 
unchecked procedural burdens might prompt undesirable responses from those who are injured. 
In extreme cases the response might be violence or disregard for official authority. In other cases 
the threat is corruption — specifically, bribes offered to achieve quick, less expensive, and favor-
able results. Magna Carta was partly intended as a remedy to corruption-encouraging undue 
process.213 And a recent study of corruption in Peru delivers a similar message with modern statis-
tical support. Economist Jennifer Hunt concludes that the frequency and amount of bribes offered 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 65, ch. 6 (addressing voting rules); POSNER, supra note 13, ch. 21; Robert E. 
Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807, 810 
(1975) (focusing on accuracy in adjudication). 
210 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66–83 (1988) (connecting 
perceived procedural “fairness” to satisfaction and compliance); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency 
Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1313 (1986) (collecting objectives for administrative proc-
ess). 
211 See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
212 The usual objections to utilitarianism apply, of course. The conflicting values might be difficult to reduce to a common metric 
without sacrificing something or misdirecting the assessment; as well, certain injuries might count as particularly severe or lexically 
prior to others in order to satisfy a sense of morality. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 112–17 
(1980). But these objections do not seem any more serious here. 
213 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
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is partly related to the speed with which government decisions are otherwise made, not simply the 
type of client served.214 
 An important caution involves indeterminacy. Designing efficient and just process for gov-
ernment decision-making is challenging and requires attention to contextual detail. It is unclear 
just how law-like the principles of design can be. Extremes can be ruled out, but this only fore-
closes relatively clear dictates within a large field of discretion. More specifically, no one wants a 
government that maximizes decision costs, at least no one who wants a functioning government. 
Nor should anyone crave a government operating on the lowest decision costs possible. That goal 
is senseless even if feasible. A government that adjudicated every dispute through a random num-
ber generating algorithm would not last long or do much business. 
 The appropriate level of decision cost can only be selected in conjunction with several other 
choices. First, objectives of the process must be identified to understand the trade-offs. Some 
goals are simply more important than others, and so they might justifiably come with greater de-
cision costs insofar as the added process helps reach the goal. Second, the designer needs a sense 
of the consequences that follow one process over another. Even if the goal is clearly defined, 
more than one process will likely be available to produce the desired decision. In resolving this 
issue and insofar as it is cost justified, process design should also account for relevant patterns of 
cognitive bias and group dynamics that are reliably identified by social science.215 There is little 
sense in using a simple rational actor model if it is unlikely to hold in practice and if process de-
signers can reasonably know how decision-makers are likely to diverge from those assumptions. 
Third, attention must be paid to the area of decisions generated by the process options under con-
sideration, along with the duration and resilience of those decisions.216 Finally, thought should be 
given to the ways in which different process choices interact over time, considering all elements 
of process with significant effects on decision costs. This means participation norms, information 
gathering efforts, voting rules and veto gates, rules/standards options, and so forth. 
 At least part of the information relevant to these choices will not be available when they are 
made. Surely there are defensible rules to guide some fraction of process design. Even so, the un-
certainty and risk accompanying these choices make it difficult or impossible to fully optimize 
process, and this is true even if every conflicting value is commensurable. The best achievable 
law of process, therefore, might include undue process norms without expecting a perfect ac-
commodation of process and non-process goals. This thought will be further developed in the 
next section. For now the basic idea is that optimal process is often unlikely, even if excessive 
decision costs sometimes might be agreed upon. 
C. Undue Process as Constitutional Law 
 Both sets of process theories, whether rights-based or more simple utilitarian, can accommo-
date undue process norms. But the latter is suited to a larger vision of undue process that captures 
all sorts of decision costs. Arguments from fundamental rights or individual human dignity come 
                                                 
214 Between 2002 and 2004, thousands of Peruvians responded to government-sponsored surveys on their bribing habits and 
other matters. Hunt used this data to run regressions, controlling for variables such as client characteristics (including employment) 
and for the frequency of contact with different types of officials. The judiciary, which has a poor record of concluding matters within a 
year, comes out particularly badly in terms of both bribe rate and amount. See Jennifer Hunt, Why Are Some Public Officials More 
Corrupt than Others?, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC CORRUPTION 1, 2–6, 22–25 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., forthcoming 2006) (con-
ceding, however, that client characteristics largely explain variance in bribe rates across official types, and also singling out the poor 
bribery record of the police who have a higher completion rate), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=904330. Data does not seem to 
be available on whether both sides to a judicial case pay off judges for speed, or whether a bribe always purchases a particular result. 
215 See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 134–47, 288–302 (3d ed. 2000); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kah-
neman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE 
L.J. 71, 74–75 (2000). Judges may fall victim to these same syndromes, of course. 
216 See supra Part I.C. 
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more easily when the objection involves government process that is exclusionary, or rushed, or 
running on educated guesses. Still, the standard process theories all point toward some kind of 
undue process norm. The hard choices involve scope and specifics. The foregoing discussion does 
not say much about federal constitutional law, however. It speaks to policy and moral reasoning 
without bearing down on precisely how undue process considerations should be integrated with a 
supreme, entrenched, fundamental law. 
1. Stories of systematic failure 
 To be convinced that undue process is a valuable addition to federal constitutional law, an 
account of political failure is useful. There might be no advantage to using constitutional law if 
ordinary law and politics are trustworthy. This idea folds into a second line of thought, concern-
ing institutional choice and design. Undue process, like any other norm with controversial appli-
cations, requires an enforcement strategy. That means undue process might be a sound policy or 
even a constitutional value without becoming attached to the most assertive forms of judicial re-
view. These considerations are connected but they can be elaborated sequentially. 
 The reasons for the existence of the original due process clause are drenched with history.217 
A similar norm was said to bind the English monarchy, at least as a matter of tradition. As noted 
above, that norm was partly a response to royal judicial corruption and heavy-handed assertions 
of executive power against elite property rights. In any event, the first due process clause was 
similarly a component of a new bargain regarding the exercise of centralized authority. It was one 
of the assurances given to skeptics of a new federal government structured and empowered in a 
way that raised concerns in the existing states. We have already seen why undue process norms 
are more difficult to ground in this history; text and other evidence present hurdles.218 But neither 
can due process proponents rely on two hundred year-old compromises as a substitute for a vi-
brant theory of political failure. Is there reason to believe that government officials, acting with-
out the threat of constitutional violation or judicial review, will systematically underproduce or 
overproduce process and decision costs? 
 This raises debatable empirical queries. There is no simple consensus model of real-world 
official behavior; certainly different officials attempt to maximize and compromise different val-
ues to different degrees in given institutional settings. But the necessary assumptions can be 
spelled out and tested for facial plausibility. 
 For example, one might suppose that a substantial number of people gaining positions of offi-
cial authority, reinforced when necessary with coercive force, will be tempted to abuse that 
power. They might use official authority to achieve personal financial gain or to shirk responsi-
bilities. Or they might strive to entrench their position, relying on the relative difficulty outsiders 
will have in assessing claims of official effort and progress. Or they might come to trust their own 
judgment to the exclusion of others, despite a lack of information or a widespread normative dis-
agreement that ought to soften any predisposition to insularity.219 Working from a widely ac-
cepted theory of democracy, these officials are agents of the public and the feared behavior con-
stitutes abuse of that relationship.220 Monitoring and responding to such misconduct (through 
                                                 
217 See generally HOWARD, supra note 117, at 298–301; ORTH, supra note 129, ch. 1. 
218 See supra Part II.B.1. 
219 See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Eric J. Johnson, The Process-Performance Paradox in Expert Judgment: How Can Experts 
Know So Much and Predict So Badly?, in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND 
CONTROVERSIES 342, 347–49 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997) (distinguishing training from experience and 
reviewing studies). 
220 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (Nov. 24, 1794) (statement of Rep. Madison) (“[T]he censorial power is in the people over the 
Government, and not in the Government over the people.”); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Plat-
forms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 916–20 (2006) (discussing democracy, agency problems, and secrecy). 
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elections, for example) might be a challenge for the general public.221 Members of Congress, per-
haps alerted by organized interests or others, can help check large-scale misconduct in other insti-
tutions and perhaps remedy a few individualized cases. But Congress cannot always be trusted, 
especially in a political context with unified government and partisan solidarity outmatching insti-
tutional competition.222 There are a multitude of unconfirmed assumptions in this familiar line of 
reasoning, yet it is entirely rational and standard to conclude that ordinary politics leaves space 
for official misconduct or illegitimate refusals to act. A constitutional law of process insulated 
from ordinary democratic change would then be in play, and perhaps some kind of judicial re-
view. 
 If we can expect principal-agent and other problems in official conduct, these abuses may 
take the form of process manipulation. Overconfidence, shirking, and desires to entrench and 
abuse authority might lead to suboptimally low procedural safeguards. For example, the insular 
and heavy-handed official might not see value in information gathering or private party participa-
tion before decisions are made. The extreme position on this line is simply dictatorship, and we 
can see facets of the due process norm as insulation from this result. There are also more subtle 
uses of process that will be attractive to the wayward agent, including some that implicate undue 
process concerns. By gaining distance from substantive outcomes, procedural manipulation might 
be somewhat insulated from charges of misconduct. Delay can be used in this fashion, along with 
heavy demands for information, participation, or extended deliberation that have an ostensible 
connection to a facially appropriate process goal. 
 The more relevant issue for present purposes is about asymmetric threats: whether there is 
sound reason to fear indefensible process denials any more than indefensible process burdens. 
The arguments thus far are too generic to make that distinction. If officials are highly prone to 
misconduct, process designers should not be preoccupied with subtle distinctions between the 
techniques of faithlessness. So consider two possibilities for distinguishing due from undue proc-
ess threats. First, if there were no general process clause of any kind, perhaps the expected magni-
tude of harm from due process violations would be greater than from undue process violations. 
The problem is that this judgment requires not only educated guesses about the specific violations 
likely to occur but also a normative evaluation of harm. Some types of harm might be viewed as 
worse than others, as indicated by the rights and dignity discussion above,223 but delay and inex-
cusably burdensome process can inflict similar injuries. Being ignored or rolled over in official 
deliberations is not categorically more damaging than being put off through inordinate delay or 
“given the runaround” within an exhausting bureaucratic maze. 
 Alternatively, it could be that the frequency of due process violations would be higher than 
undue process violations. This possibility is attractive although hard to test. Albeit with com-
plaints, the country has survived with an explicit due process guarantee that appears not to have 
been vigorously used for undue process purposes until recently. Our sense of the matter might be 
affected by the evolution of government character and missions, however. In a situation like the 
early years of the nation, when the federal government’s functions were unsettled and conten-
tious, perhaps resource constraints were likely to conflict with the regulatory ambitions of central 
government officials. Even if those ambitions were public regarding, there might have been worry 
that officials would all-too-readily jettison rudimentary procedural hindrances. On the other hand, 
                                                 
221 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 345, 355 (2000) (claiming that the mechanisms of control over government officials by voters are probably less forceful than 
those used to discipline corporate management); John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Account-
ability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 131, 137 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999). 
222 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2006) (sug-
gesting this is the case today). 
223 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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the frequencies might shift in a mature bureaucracy with an established turf to defend.224 Com-
paratively speaking, today’s federal government is a behemoth that could not have been foreseen 
during the founding era. It now administers a vast set of regulatory programs and entitlements.225 
The defense or expansion of this turf might involve red tape rather than overly aggressive action. 
Perhaps some government officials generate additional process in a way that inflates their impor-
tance. Regardless, modern observers have to be concerned that bloated protocols will too often 
obstruct or delay warranted decisions, frustrating some citizens and encouraging others to engage 
in destructive forms of self-help or corruption. 
 Furthermore, one type of undue process problem might be insidious. It is the syndrome of 
nonsalient injury. Recall that the most ambitious versions of undue process move beyond officials 
burdening one party or another with indefensible decision costs. In addition, the concept includes 
threats to nonparties, such as taxpayers who finance government decision-making as well as oth-
ers who have an interest in speed or a streamlined protocol.226 When process is awarded to A 
and/or B, often C suffers or is put at risk. These threats might not be salient — cognitively or po-
litically — to officials who are otherwise free to design their own decision-making process. To 
the extent that administrative costs of procedural safeguards are spread to nameless and faceless 
taxpayers or potential alternative beneficiaries of government programs, these costs seem less 
likely to generate intense political backlash227 or vivid losses that will be immediately available to 
the process arbiter.228 We might plausibly reach a different conclusion about the hoped-for gains 
associated with decision costs, such as accuracy and legitimacy in the minds of participants. Con-
ventional due process doctrine probably feeds this asymmetric salience, as it presents the threat of 
judicial rebuke for low-decision-cost process but not the reverse.229 At the very least, salience 
problems shake any a priori conclusion that due process violations swamp undue process risks in 
the modern state. 
                                                 
224 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38–41 (1971). To be clear, turf-
building claims are contested. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 
923–34 (2005) (highlighting subsequent scholarship). 
225 Exactly what effect constitutionally optional entitlements should have on the constitutional law of procedure is a long-
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certain social welfare entitlements were themselves constitutionally required, independent of any lapse in political commitment to 
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(1970) (upholding caps on welfare payments to families), although moderated versions of social welfare rights emerged in some for-
eign constitutions of the 1990s and through state constitutional litigation involving public education funding. See supra note 98 (citing 
sources); see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 2801–03 (2005) (rejecting for lack of entitlement a “due process” 
claim to more serious police consideration of pleas to enforce a restraining order); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989). 
There is overlap — functional if not conceptual — between certain undue process claims and pure social welfare or service de-
livery claims. An individual who demands immediate delivery of income support from a bureaucracy or shorter response times from 
the local police department is not very different from the individual who argues that these services are per se mandated by constitu-
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between the two claims, however. The undue process claim is parasitic on a democratic choice to make the entitlement, and it might 
even deter or confine new entitlements by increasing their associated decision costs. The pure claim for social welfare rights lacks 
these features. Moreover, there is no clear and heavy ideological valence for undue process claims under current conditions. They may 
assist the real estate developer or people with disabilities, the pharmaceutical innovator or the food stamps applicant. Supporters of the 
undue process concept might have to accept a relatively efficient government, however, and reject the strategy of limiting the state by 
increasing the cost of its process. In addition, one strand of undue process tends to favor executive action, and this tendency might 
trigger ideological divides. 
226 See supra Parts I.B, I.C.2 & III.A. 
227 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ch. 2 (1971); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without 
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 291 (1988) (suggesting that “proce-
dural obstacles do little to impede consensual demand patterns (where laws bring concentrated benefits and dispersed costs)”). 
228 See, e.g., BARON, supra note 215, at 141–43 (discussing the availability heuristic, which can confound accurate estimation of 
probability); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 81–82 (2002) (identifying outright probability neglect as dis-
tinct from availability heuristics). 
229 To the extent officials are spooked by due process doctrine, however, the solution might be relaxation of those constitutional 
norms rather than a new one. Mathews suggests this response is possible. 
Undue Process 09/11/2006 Draft Page 42 
 
 Finally, note that the foregoing concentrates on one type of error: officials making decisions 
with suboptimal process or decision costs. But there is another type of error that could be equally 
important: observers erroneously judging a given process unconstitutional. Perhaps some of these 
errors are less troubling than others. Consider an asserted due process right to participate in an 
adjudicatory administrative hearing. Erroneously granting the right will have beneficial side ef-
fects, as the participant gains voice in the process, even if that benefit was not constitutionally 
required in light of the costs imposed on the government and interested parties. Compare a mis-
taken conclusion that a government process is constitutionally undue. In the context of agency 
adjudication, we might expect that erroneously streamlining a process has fewer benefits, all else 
equal. But this is no more than guesswork, and a quick conclusion might ignore nonsalient bene-
fits to third parties. Much depends on the objectives of the decisions and how elements of process 
are valued. Erroneous process mandates can disrupt fragile compromises. Perhaps policymakers 
are working with a set budget and expect a certain number of beneficiaries in need of financial 
assistance, who can be timely reached only by no-frills process that tolerates regular error, but 
agencies are more comfortable with a leisurely standard operating procedure.230 What we can be 
sure of is that the analysis is complex and unlikely to yield a reliable systematic advantage to due 
or undue process norms. 
 There is reason to support a process clause in the Constitution but the content of that provi-
sion is easily contested. Indeed the defense of a due process clause enforced by supreme judicial 
review is not indisputable. One might at least conclude that the case for an undue process clause 
is not dramatically weaker than the clause we actually have. 
2. Institutional choice and design 
 If the analysis thus far is correct, a process law of some kind is easily defended and the desir-
ability of constitutionalizing part of that law is at least arguable. Ordinary politics, administrative 
behavior, and judicial practices will not always generate process for their own decisions that op-
timally serves the public interest or majority preferences. Although an enforced constitutional 
demand for optimal process of law seems impractical, generalized due and undue process guaran-
tees might both be attractive if they are well-crafted. As a theoretical matter, the arguments do not 
seem clearly better for one over the other. Members of the public should be, and probably are, 
concerned about both kinds of error. A central element of the analysis is still missing, however. 
This section explores whether judicial review is a sensible addition to an undue process norm. 
Perhaps this inquiry into institutional choice will tip the arguments against undue process, or at 
least reveal practical differences between due and undue process that have been elusive so far.231 
 A fundamental trade-off posed by judicial review is between competence and independent 
judgment. That exchange is grounded in two ideas about official behavior.232 The first is probably 
self-evident. It is the thought that familiarity with a situation builds practical knowledge. Trained 
officials who repeatedly perform similar tasks in similar settings, or who have operated within an 
organization for a substantial term, are more likely to correctly assess the consequences of one 
process over another. All else equal, insider knowledge beats outsider guesses. But all else is not 
equal. The second idea about official behavior is that self-judgment can threaten the public good. 
Like anyone else, government officials might be selfish and irresponsible or myopic and overcon-
fident about their own abilities.233 Outsiders, in contrast, might offer a more accurate assessment 
                                                 
230 FEMA assistance to Hurricane Katrina victims might fit here. 
231 On institutional choice and design theories generally, see, for example, David L. Weimer, Institutional Design: An Overview, 
in INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 12 (David L. Weimer ed., 1995); see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
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232 See Samaha, supra note 23, at 525–26 (noting the trade and its assumptions). 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 219–221. 
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of work performed by others — if they possess sufficient skill to perform the observation. But 
this shifts the inquiry back to knowledge asymmetries and it makes the issue of external oversight 
look like a tragic dilemma. The two ideas seem to present a maddening zero-sum trade: compe-
tence with bias, or dispassion with naiveté. Court judgments are subject to this exchange. Judges 
might be honest yet error-prone brokers, or parochial yet expert players. And under certain ver-
sions of judicial review, their constitutional opinions are supreme. In addition, there is a decision 
cost to this type of oversight. Constitutional judicial review adds a veto gate to process decisions, 
and so judicial review can itself increase net decision costs. These costs can be minimized: if ju-
dicial preferences are crystal clear and articulated in large-area decisions announcing comprehen-
sive rules, then speculation and litigation costs should fall for everyone else. But by now the vul-
nerabilities of this approach should be easy to discern.234 
 There are several responses short of eliminating external oversight. Some government process 
is simple enough for judges to become educated in a short time. Incompetence is then an easily 
corrected condition. In addition, we might retain constitutional judicial review but hope to sculpt 
it such that error costs are reduced without intolerable decision costs. For those who support fun-
damental rights or individual dignity theories, we might expect judges to be more capable of un-
derstanding and respecting these values than certain other government officials. The scope of ju-
dicial review could be restricted to situations in which those values are in jeopardy. In a related 
vein, the judiciary might commit itself to small-area decisions. This can leave more room for ex-
perimentation, adaptation, and course reversals, albeit with a new set of decision costs that follow 
the shadow of litigation. Regardless of the scope of judicial review, its intensity might be moder-
ated. Thus in cases where outsider education is costly and valuable rights are not at stake, the ju-
diciary might normally defer to expert judgment of other officials. This has actually happened in 
landmark due process cases like Mathews v. Eldridge235 and perhaps Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.236 There 
are even ways to moderate the resilience and supremacy of judicial review, although federal 
courts seem to deploy these options sparingly and they threaten to hike up decision costs over the 
long run. In evaluating constitutional claims, the force of stare decisis is said to be weaker, any-
way.237 Perhaps it could leave even more room for judicial reconsideration in the class of undue 
process claims. Or courts might leave final judgments to another institution such as Congress, 
thereby testing hopefully more efficient process without foreclosing error correction by others.238 
 Finally, oversight need not come from judges. Congress sometimes aggressively monitors 
agency practices, for instance, or legislates to achieve efficient administration. A model is the Of-
fice of Inspector General (OIG).239 OIGs are embedded within certain agencies and charged with 
identifying waste, fraud, and abuse of executive power, yet they have some insulation from pres-
sure by agency management.240 The OIG track record might not be perfect but the basic idea was 
an innovative response to the old trade-off between competence and impartiality. Given their mis-
                                                 
234 Note, too, justiciability norms and litigation strategy that can skew court dockets. 
235 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (demanding that substantial weight be afforded good-faith administrator judgment about what proc-
ess is due under the circumstances). 
236 542 U.S. 507, 528–39 (2004) (following the Mathews framework and stopping well short of dictating Article III criminal 
process, but rejecting the executive’s position on the process due U.S. citizens detained on U.S. soil after capture on a foreign battle-
field); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (concluding that Congress did not fail to provide “meaningful safe-
guards or remedies”). 
237 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989). 
238 See Henry P. Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 15–17, 20–21, 29, 34 (1975) (dis-
cussing, in part, the dormant commerce clause and Miranda warnings). 
239 See generally PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTOR GENERALS AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
(1993). 
240 See NASA v. FLRA, 527 U.S. 229 (1999) (noting, however, that “[t]here is no ‘OIG-OIG’”). 
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sion, moreover, the existence of OIGs should somewhat curb any enthusiasm for judicial suprem-
acy over undue process objections, at least with respect to the federal executive.241 
 So if the question is whether judicial review of undue process claims is likely to do more 
good than harm, there is no easy answer. The choices are not binary; both judicial review and un-
due process objections come in multiple forms. One way forward is to consider reasons to be 
comfortable without judicial review of a generic undue process norm, then attempt to specify 
conditions under which judicial review is most likely to succeed. 
 Leaving the issue to ordinary law and politics would probably not be, and has not been, disas-
trous. Without generic and judicially enforced undue process claims, the system would function 
roughly the way it does now. Congress might legislate to add, subtract, or otherwise modify the 
decision-making procedures for the executive branch and for the federal judiciary.242 Insofar as it 
has not, the executive and judiciary might draft their own rules for their own purposes, as well as 
consider pleas for reform.243 If the system errs and manufactures excessive protocols for decision, 
pressure for change may come from officers within those institutions or from outsiders. As well, 
the mechanism for reform could be either internal (institutions altering their own process) or ex-
ternal (legislation or even constitutional amendment). Certainly there are limits to this structure. 
Congress tends to run its own shop, and state process is often unchecked by federal statute or 
regulation. But typically the process for creating process already involves consent from more than 
one institution. 
 And the existing avenues for reform have yielded meaningful results. Putting aside monitor-
ing and deterrence from OIG investigations and reports, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
authorizes courts to order action in the face of unreasonable delay.244 In 1996, the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act codified judicial practice and added new restrictions on federal 
habeas corpus, including a one-year limitations period and strict requirements for second and suc-
cessive applications.245 And the Tax Injunction Act forbids federal district court injunctions only 
if “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”246 Each of these 
efforts authorize judicial action that can limit decision costs in a subconstitutional way. The net 
benefit of these efforts is not always clear,247 but neither is any dominance of pro-process forces 
over anti-process interests in ordinary politics. 
 For some categories of cases, this hands-off approach is too sanguine. And if those categories 
are readily apparent, judicial review for undue process is probably just as desirable as for due 
process. The leading candidate is administrative adjudication. Courts not only deal in procedure 
constantly, agency adjudication is probably the nonjudicial process most recognizable to judges. 
Concerns about incompetence are therefore reduced, while the judiciary might be detached in a 
                                                 
241 Judicial intervention need not be entirely foreclosed. On the concept of constitutionally optional platforms that support judi-
cial intervention for constitutional objectives, see Samaha, supra note 220, at 960–69 (demanding an existing constitutional norm, 
however). 
242 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for car-
rying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution”). 
243 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (granting federal courts authority to “prescribe rules for the conduct of their business,” if con-
sistent with statutes); Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (recognizing inherent executive authority to restrict 
access to sensitive information). 
244 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“The reviewing court shall—(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . . . 
.”). It seems this provision is rarely invoked successfully in litigation. For a partial exception, see Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Norton, 
285 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12–17 (D.D.C. 2003). But even if agencies are violating the statutory standard, it is not clear that a constitutional 
norm would look much different or be more effective. 
245 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). 
246 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 
247 Habeas rules have generated enough litigation to forestall any snap judgment that they reduce decision costs. To take another 
example, the time limits for agency response in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6), are commonly thought to be 
ineffective. But cf. ACLU v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 504–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (ordering certain execu-
tive agencies to respond to eleven-month-old FOIA requests for documents regarding post-9/11 detainees). 
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healthy fashion. In addition, because judicial process is often more elaborate than agency adjudi-
cation, there could be an internal check on judicial insensitivity to agency needs. Courts are likely 
accustomed to the sort of extended procedure on which an undue process complaint would typi-
cally rest. This would not always be true. Demands for agency speed might enjoy too much sym-
pathy since the courts will not bear the costs of haste, and an expansive undue process norm 
would allow agencies to challenge statutes as too burdensome. 
Low intensity judicial review is a possible cure, with deference to reasonable administrative 
judgment. Conveniently, Mathews already made this adjustment for due process claims that ad-
ministrative process is insufficiently attentive to an applicant’s claim to benefits. As the quasi-
Mathews cases indicate,248 it is a short step in familiar terrain for courts to treat administrative 
decision costs as a matter of constitutional concern. Assuming the same level of deference, the 
judiciary is no less competent running Mathews’ all-told cost/benefit test in the opposite direction. 
If judicial review for undue process can be supported anywhere, it is for ordinary administrative 
adjudication. 
 In fact, undue process advocates should probably forfeit all claims involving the generation of 
prospective and generally applicable rules, legislation, and doctrine. Once again, a similar line 
already operates in orthodox due process territory although on a distinct rationale.249 Compared to 
most adjudication, it is categorically more difficult to demonstrate excessive decision costs in 
these fields. One reason is that courts would be forced to compare decision costs to the social 
value of such rules, which is controversial for the regulation of primary human conduct. When is 
it evident that the political process has grappled with stem cell research subsidies long enough, in 
light of the issue’s significance and the diminishing value of debate? 
Even if such questions have answers other than “never,” there remains a crucial distinction 
from ordinary adjudication. It is the disparate comfort with decisional resilience. If we think of 
adjudication as the interpretation and application of otherwise revisable policy to the decision-
maker’s rendition of historical fact, tolerance for reconsideration often should be low. Adjudica-
tion of this type ought to be resilient because the historical facts will not often be worth revisiting 
by government officials and the policy in question will not be fully set in this process. If we think 
of rulemaking as the process by which these policies are created and revised, resilience and 
unlimited duration are out of place. This is especially so when substantial shifts in preferences are 
likely over time.250 It is for this reason hard to fathom a law of res judicata for statutes, whether or 
not enforced by the judiciary. Society is probably better off with freedom to revisit questions like 
the desirability of national health insurance, income taxes over consumption taxes, and the death 
penalty — even though reconsideration means decision costs. There is no guarantee the adjudica-
tion/rulemaking line is adequately nuanced; retroactive legislation, for instance, might be an eas-
ier target for decision cost caps than many acts of adjudication. But the distinction seems to hold 
as a general matter. 
 For different reasons, supreme judicial review of process imposed on the judiciary itself is 
also problematic. Obviously courts are informed about the operations of their own institution but 
here they are most likely to assume parochial stances. This threat is acute when the upshot of the 
                                                 
248 See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
249 See supra note 109 (citing cases relying on impracticality and political safeguards, along with judicial competence concerns); 
see also Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–10 
(1942) (developing a related distinction between “adjudicative” and “legislative” facts); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial 
Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 114 (1988) (emphasizing overlap in the categories). Judicial competence ques-
tions fit with the analysis in text. But the feasibility and political safeguards rationales are controversial even for due process claims. 
The possibility of mass public input is now perfectly conceivable with the development of notice and comment rulemaking and mod-
ern communications technology. And strong strands of contemporary public choice theory deny that widely dispersed burdens system-
atically trigger widespread political backlash. See supra note 227. 
250 Cf. Posner, supra note 65, at 445 (distinguishing litigation from advertising). 
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objection calls for reduction in judicial effort. Then one must worry that a court will invoke con-
stitutional law to manage its own workload without adequate sympathy for other interests. And 
the ubiquity of decision costs makes public-spirited rhetoric easier to deploy. Process imposes 
costs on a large class of people and, like other officials, judges can use that fact to appear sympa-
thetic while serving lower-minded interests in docket clearing. An independent judiciary can have 
clear advantages over other actors, but judging whether a case is too much work is probably not 
one of them. This makes highly questionable, from an institutional design perspective, the Court’s 
protection of its own civil judgments in Plaut.251 
 There is no need to exhaust the possibilities for undue process in this space. It is appropriate, 
however, to close with a suggested tiebreaker: when in doubt, reject undue process as a judicially 
enforceable federal constitutional norm. This position is supported by two arguments. The first 
involves the role of constitutional text in reducing decision costs. Those who are especially sensi-
tive to decision costs — even those who view government institutions as consistently weighted 
down with routines and habitually foisting process burdens on those they serve and on third par-
ties — ought to pause before endorsing supreme constitutional law as a palliative. The govern-
ment has a patent obligation to refrain from significant injury to private parties without minimum 
procedural safeguards. Traditionally these safeguards have been understood as process floors. 
Adding to that understanding entails a measure of creativity, which undercuts the focal point 
function of constitutional text and conventional interpretation. 
 The textual objection is reinforced by the multiplicity of choices that would follow. The issue 
of constitutionalizing undue process is hardly an either/or proposition. Any such claim requires 
boundaries and qualifications, and so endorsing the claim’s initiation must come with a tolerance 
for new constitutional law developed over time. Because government decision-making always 
imposes costs, familiar practices are bound to be left in doubt as the details are worked out. If the 
experience with due process is instructive, judicial investigation can settle into a standard frame-
work with more specific doctrinal tributaries; in time, undue process litigation would surely fol-
lows a similar course. But there is serious doubt whether officials should be forced to respond at 
all to the predilections of the federal judiciary on questions of “excessive” decision costs, and no 
perfect assurance that courts will engineer a constitutional law of undue process ideally matched 
to their institutional limits. 
D. Nightmares Relived 
 The lessons from the foregoing analysis can be synthesized into three more specific ideas. 
First, those concerned with decision costs have every reason to respect constitutional text and 
conventional interpretive method. This produces tension between unbridled normative aspirations 
and the capacity of federal constitutional law, but in exchange for sensible results. Second and 
similarly, undue process protection ought to accompany existing constitutional commitments to 
nonarbitrary government decision-making, valued private conduct such as political speech and 
religious liberty, and equality norms. This is part of current practice even if not so recognized. 
Third, any generic undue process norm backed with judicial review must have serious limits. It 
could borrow the Mathews test, but the objection should probably be (1) restricted to agency ad-
judication, (2) fenced off from generally applicable rulemaking, (3) moderated with deference to 
expert judgment, (4) cognizant of subconstitutional alternatives, and (5) reconciled with surviving 
due process mandates. These ideas now can be illustrated by application to the process night-
mares with which this Article opened. The following remarks are provisional; relevant informa-
                                                 
251 See supra Part II.B.2.c. While there is no evidence of bad faith, federal judicial unwillingness to entertain relitigation in the 
Schiavo controversy is in the same category. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274–75 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(Birch, J., concurring) (unconvincingly challenging the validity of the Schiavo Act); Samaha, supra note 23, at 510–16, 528. 
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tion is missing and future developments might shift the analysis. The more plausible undue proc-
ess violations nevertheless can be separated from the less likely. 
1. Plausible objections 
 The Senate filibuster is one of those rare processes vulnerable to a straightforward textual 
constitutional objection. Although Article I, Section 5 gives the Senate authority to make rules for 
its proceedings,252 that grant cannot supersede other constitutional requirements.253 The issue is 
whether today’s practice conflicts with the best reading of the Constitution on voting rules, and it 
certainly might. In sections addressing both legislation and appointments, the text specifies a su-
permajority voting rule for certain situations (veto overrides and treaty ratification) and is silent 
for others (passing bills and consenting to appointments).254 Filibuster and cloture practices func-
tion quite like a supermajority rule, especially now, when filibustering senators no longer must 
take the floor and debate anything. The exercise bears little relation to information gathering or 
deliberation. In addition, the vice president cannot vote in the Senate “unless they [the senators] 
be equally divided.”255 This suggests majority voting rules were expected, at least sometimes, and 
obviously majority rule was a familiar idea at the founding. Of course there are arguments on the 
other side. These voting rules might be left for each house to determine, perhaps because the Con-
stitution’s drafters and ratifiers never thought about the question. And occasionally the text speci-
fies a majority voting rule.256 Hesitance about the constitutional claim stems from immediate po-
litical concerns, which counts for little, but also the uncertain effects of revising a complex insti-
tution with a substantial tradition and a web of external relationships. In addition, the issue might 
not be justiciable. But these complications should not obscure the conventional elegance of the 
objection: it relies on text and simple interpretive tools, it does not seem contradicted by original-
ist history, and its success would have a fair chance of reducing decision costs for both appoint-
ments and legislation. One can embrace the position that the Constitution generally elevates rather 
than caps decision costs, and still believe that current filibuster practice is a forbidden innovation 
of senatorial clubishness. 
 Death row delay and anti-development efforts have less constitutional text to survey yet they 
present opportunities for undue process victories. Lackey claims are attached to the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment.” Incarceration pending 
execution is undoubtedly a component of punishment and, for some inmates, the psychological 
stress might be unnecessarily cruel and atypical. For parts of our country’s history, capital pun-
ishment was often carried out expeditiously.257 More recently, there are instances of inmates 
spending a decade or two on death row, perhaps careening between stays of execution and im-
pending execution dates. Powerful counterarguments are available, to be sure. Staying on the di-
mension of decision costs, the judiciary requires a test for indefensible delay unless these claims 
can be tolerably litigated on a fact-bound basis. Providing that guidance will be challenging, al-
though not impossible. Speedy trial cases help, since they separate delay attributable to the defen-
dant from that for which the state is responsible.258 The more profound objection concerns capital 
punishment as a system. A successful Lackey claimant would presumably receive immunity from 
                                                 
252 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”). 
253 See id. art. V (requiring, in plain text, a two-thirds vote). 
254 See id. art. I, § 7; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
255 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. Credit goes to Adam Cox for pointing this out. 
256 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (presidential and vice presidential elections); id. amend. XII (same); id. amend. XXV, § 2 (filling vice 
presidential vacancies); id. § 4 (presidential succession); cf. id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (quorum rule). However, in almost none of these situa-
tions is a sitting vice president able to vote per his tie-breaking authority, so these majority rules are not reaching that territory in a way 
that directly undercuts the possibility of an implicit majority voting rule for ordinary legislation and appointments. 
257 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
258 See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657–58 (1992). 
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the relevant death sentence.259 But government officials would not lose their ongoing interest in 
capital punishment, and we can expect them to avoid the problem by expediting pending and sub-
sequent cases. Courts might do likewise. Now we are faced with the problem of rising error costs 
which, in this context, can be life-threatening. Unless due process-like mandates are rolled back 
— which seems unlikely given the stakes for the defendant and a mountain of text, doctrine, and 
tradition — recognizing Lackey claims produces a constitutional pincer. The system must be ex-
traordinarily accurate and incomparably participatory yet substantially quicker to judgment. Even 
ignoring those who might support endless process in capital cases as second-best to abolition, in-
tensely difficult trade-offs make this sort of undue process claim controversial even if plausible. 
 Cases like the Stroud Township development are simpler. The claim is that local officials 
purposefully ignored established procedure to delay and defeat a low-income housing develop-
ment. On this account, officials evaded standard operating procedures in order to achieve an ob-
jective that they were embarrassed or afraid to accomplish by formal legal amendment. Claims 
such as this often turn on disputes of historical fact and official purpose, and they challenge proc-
ess with features of adjudication. Officials will present legitimate reasons for inaction or paper-
work, including budget constraints and accuracy in assessing neighborhood impact. But these is-
sues are pedestrian and manageable. The claims need not threaten land use regulation per se, at 
least when limited to as-applied allegations of lawless attempts to evade those very practices. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to be cautious. Claimants might underestimate the value of state law 
remedies. And while they may point to the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, we have 
seen the weakness of that connection.260 Furthermore, there is no apparent principle confining 
these arguments to land use matters. Courts might have to recognize an undue process objection 
applicable to a large area of process, even if the claim’s elements are easily restricted to arbitrary, 
irrational, or purposefully lawless conduct. 
2. Implausible objections 
 The other three “nightmares” — FEMA processing, ossified rulemaking, and Yucca Moun-
tain — are similar to the Stroud Township affair in that they lack objections grounded in straight-
forward textual interpretation. They require additional ingenuity. But there are deeper reasons 
why these examples are unappealing cases for constitutional objection. 
 Consider FEMA’s tardy processing of applications for assistance after Hurricane Katrina. 
One distinction is scale. Tens of thousands of people were eligible for assistance and FEMA had 
obligations beyond processing these requests. Apart from resources issues, the situation was suf-
ficiently complex that a court might understandably pause before intervening with constitutional 
law. Judicial competence is at issue here, although some of FEMA’s paper-pushing duties resem-
ble familiar court activity. But this is not the best reason for denying undue process claims; the 
Mathews balancing test already forces the judiciary to investigate complex administrative sys-
tems. The fundamental problem is that constitutional law is not plainly needed. The APA obli-
gates courts that have properly acquired jurisdiction to “compel agency action unlawfully with-
held or unreasonably delayed.”261 It is difficult to believe constitutional law requires more, or that 
a constitutional label will trigger more invasive judicial oversight. This might be true even if 
process rights should be inspired by dignity theories; such offenses can be labeled “unreason-
able.” Lawyers understandably add constitutional claims in an effort to reinforce statutory argu-
                                                 
259 Usually inmates who want their executions to go forward (eerily labeled “volunteers”) may achieve that result by ceasing liti-
gation and clemency efforts. Conceivably execution might be indefensibly delayed even though the inmate volunteers; in those situa-
tions, a Lackey claim might be vindicated by an injunction that the execution take place shortly. 
260 See supra Part II.B.2. 
261 5 U.S.C. § 706; supra note 244. 
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ments, but the district court in the FEMA litigation had no strong reason to address plaintiffs’ 
constitutional demands.262 
 Agency rulemaking might be subject to the same analysis, along with additional hurdles and 
twists. With the peanut butter content order fiasco, shocking decision costs were a product of 
congressional mandate, an order that was apparently low on the agency’s priority list, and organ-
ized economic interests taking advantage of the resulting process opportunities.263 Perhaps FDA 
should have given up in view of the possible benefits of the order, or moved more aggressively if 
it was convinced of the public health benefits. But remember that Congress opened the door to 
staggering decision costs by explicitly permitting affected industries in a certain class of cases to 
demand trial-type hearings on their objections. It is at least possible that FDA would not have re-
ceived statutory authority to issue such orders affecting millions of consumers and sales without 
this gold-plated process. The coalition responsible for the statute might have intentionally and 
even reasonably decided that any order in this field should come with a process-driven price tag. 
In some contrast, the ossification literature often identifies a different syndrome: the judiciary 
over-reading congressional mandates and agencies possibly overreacting to insulate themselves 
from remand.264 Here the question is, again, the need for constitutional law. If courts are misinter-
preting statutes and ignoring practical agency needs, constitutional arguments are not obviously 
needed or effectual where the judiciary has the final word. Finally, whether or not a statute re-
quires the decision costs under challenge, these cases involve prospective generally applicable 
rules. For reasons given, this is not the most stable area for judicial intervention.265 
 Undue process complaints about the Yucca Mountain repository share many of these weak-
nesses. In some ways, this controversy is among the most frustrating. The political process was 
responding to the real-world problem of nuclear waste storage, based on scientific opinion of the 
NAS. While political leaders determined a facility should be built, however, the location decision 
has consumed decades of process. This is not to say that the scientific debate is over, or that con-
troversial normative judgments are not involved, or that the nuclear power industry has not ex-
erted in some sense disproportionate influence on the issue. Yet undue process opponents ought 
to be dismayed. The ordinary political process is already costly, and it concocted an additional 
layer of procedure that is extraordinary. Practically every government institution we have is in-
volved, some at multiple decision points. At the same time, a constitutional objection is disturb-
ing. First, there is no apparent conflict with the text or existing judicial judgment. Second, even if 
                                                 
262 See McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 232–33 (E.D. La. 2005) (briefly addressing and denying the APA and constitu-
tional claims together; leaving open the possibility of subsequent relief). To be fair, a recognized constitutional norm might prompt 
more vigorous judicial use of the APA provision. The district court might have been too shy in tolerating FEMA processing delays, 
considering the victims’ dire need — and yet the court was discordantly comfortable ordering the temporary continuation of a ho-
tel/motel housing program that FEMA wanted to phase out. See id. at 233–37 (relying on statutory interpretation and victim need). 
Ordinarily, however, fiscal considerations will legitimately militate against delay-based undue process claims. They might matter even 
in a situation like Katrina. A recent investigation of FEMA’s Individuals and Households program estimated that $1 billion was im-
properly awarded out of $6 billion in outlays for Katrina and Rita. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA 
AND RITA DISASTER RELIEF: IMPROPER AND POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS ESTIMATED TO BE 
BETWEEN $600 MILLION AND $1.4 BILLION 1 (2006) (GAO-06-844T). 
263 Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 525, 533 & n. 32 (1997) (asserting that “in most rulemaking contexts, regulatees have an interest in slowing down the process of 
writing rules”). 
264 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 40, at 83–84; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 59, 65 (1995); see also Kagan, supra note 7, at 2266–67; McGarity, supra note 40, at 1400–01, 1410–20, 1426, 1444. But cf. 
Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1125–31 (2002) (reviewing empirical stud-
ies and their skepticism about ossification); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify 
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 489–90 (1997). The findings of a de-ossification critic 
even suggest that years of delay are at stake. See William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 440–
41 (2000) (studying agency action after remand by the D.C. Circuit and finding agencies are usually able to accomplish their policies 
after about two years). 
265 See supra Part III.C.2. 
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the quasi-Mathews idea could reach this situation, it probably should not. The decision about a 
repository in general and Yucca in particular is an extremely important, large-area decision with a 
path dependence indicating resilience. The future of nuclear power could be at stake. Building 
and stocking the facility is a difficult-to-reverse, multigenerational policy judgment affecting hu-
man health, the environment, energy resources, the economy, and perhaps national security.266 
Finally, one reason for extensive process is to legitimize decisions. Few can deny the relative in-
clusiveness of the veto gates erected here, and few can believe that a federal court has a better 
sense of when the debate needs to end. For all of these reasons, one can effectively defend the 
siting process from constitutional attack. 
CONCLUSION 
 A concern about decision costs is part of federal constitutional law, and rightly so. The text 
itself serves a decision-cost reducing function. Part of that text, perhaps most of it, accomplishes 
nothing else. Some courts have gone further, and experimented with a generic undue process 
claim that could reach as much government conduct as contemporary due process doctrine. The 
intentions of these cases seem honorable, and they help expose another dimension to process-
oriented constitutional law. These decisions suggest that a crippled or intransigent government is 
no better than an autocratic one. Moreover, a generalized undue process norm can be sensibly 
designed for judicial use by concentrating on agency adjudication instead of prospective rulemak-
ing, incorporating deference to expert official judgment, while remaining mindful of nonconstitu-
tional remedies and surviving due process floors. 
 Still, there are strong reasons for caution. The ideal claim is not necessarily what the judiciary 
would produce. In addition, the urge to deploy constitutional law in these circumstances must be 
implemented with a kind of creativity that conflicts with its motivating force. Decision costs are 
often ordinary costs, and they can be generated by judicial review no less than nonjudicial deci-
sion-making. That said, undue process claims are defensible in particular contexts. For example, 
they should be used in service of established constitutional values, and they already are. It is pos-
sible for the judiciary to do somewhat more without serious risk. But precisely because decision 
costs matter, the federal constitutional law of undue process should be like the procedure it tends 
to favor: clear-cut, moderate, and usually absent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments may address them to: 
 
Professor Adam Samaha 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL 60637 
 asamaha@uchicago.edu 
                                                 
266 Compare Fred Dilger & Robert J. Halstead, Integrating Hazards Assessment and Impact Assessment: The Case of the Cali-
ente Rail Corridor to Yucca Mountain (Mar. 1, 2005), available at www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2005/wm/caliente_rail.pdf (stress-
ing the danger of transporting waste from over one-hundred sites), with John Yoo & Jennifer Koester, Judicial Safeguards of Federal-
ism and the Environment: Yucca Mountain from a Constitutional Perspective, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1336 (2004) (stressing the 
danger of attack on those existing sites). 
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